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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of things done against our will, through ignorance; and of those actions which are, or…
BY ignorance many things are done by us, whereof we rejoyce after the deed: As when a man killeth his enemy at unawares (or against his will) and yet is glad that he is slaine. These, & such like things, are neither accounted voluntary, nor altogether involuntary.
Some things also are done through ignorance, for which we grieve after they are done: And those are usually called things done against our will, after the doing wherof we become grieved for the act. And by this it appeares that there be two sorts of things done by ignorance; the one not volūtary, & the other quite against our will.
It is our purpose therefore, to treat at this time of such things as are altogether against our will: because that which wee call not voluntary (as aforesaid) may rather be reduced to those things which are voluntary in regard it is mixt of both.
For though it hath a beginning by constraint, yet the end is voluntary; because by the event, that becomes voluntary, which was first against our will.
Therefore a thing done IIagainst our will, is defined in this manner; That is an involuntary act, which is not only against our wil, but hath also griefe & repentance annexed thereunto. Moreover, it is one thing to doe an act through ignorance, and another thing to doe it, being ignorant: For if that thing which caused the ignorance be in our power, we doe it being ignorant; but not by ignorance.
For example, he that is accustomed unto drunkennesse, or to anger, and in his wrath or drunkennesse, committeth an evill; he hath (indeed) drunkennesse, or anger, as a cause of those things which are done by him: But neverthelesse those things were voluntary (for it was in his power not to have beene drunke (or so inraged) and therefore in not suppressing those inordinate appetites, hee himselfe was cause of his own ignorance; and may in that regard be said to have done that evil being ignorant; but cannot be truly said to have done it through ignorance: Neither is his act to bee accounted as done, by constraint, but voluntarily; for that cause he who doth commit such things is justly reprehended by good men: Even because his drunkennesse (which occasioned that act) being voluntary, makes the act which was therby occasioned, to be voluntary also.
But we are said to doe things through ignorance, when wee our selves gave no cause of that ignorance; and when the deed was by chance. As if a man should shoot in an usuall shooting place, & happen to hit and slay his father walking thereabout.
It is plaine by that which is aforesaid, that the actions of such a man are not to bee accounted as done against his will, who is ignorant of such things as it behooveth him to know; or which reputes evill things to bee goo: For this ignorance proceeds from his owne wickednesse; and as his actions are vitious, so his ignorance also is to be accounted as a vice, for which he is worthy of reprehensiō. And reprehension is due only to those things which are voluntarily done.
For the ignorance of generall (or universall) things; or of such as are in choice, is not accounted to bee a thing involuntary; but the ignorance of particular things onely, is esteemed such: For we may be ignorant of particular things against our will. But of universall things, our ignorance is accounted voluntary; because such an ignorance cannot bee in us without our owne fault; except we are madmen, or Idiots.
This being thus determined,IIIit now resteth to be declared, what those particulars are of which we speake; and they are the same which the Rhetoricians call the parts or circumstāces of things done. (To wit) WHO, WHOM, WHAT, WITH WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, in WHAT MANER, for WHAT CAUSE, (To which may bee added according to our English game used for an exercise of wit, WHAT FOLLOVVED, or the event of that which was done.)
The persons are either he who did it, or he to whom the thing was done; as if the Sonne should smite his Father at unawares. The thing done, is the action it selfe; as if I intended to give one a little blow on the eare, and thereby struck out his eye. The instrument; as whē one flings a very stone, and thinkes it but a pommy stone. The place; as when at the turning of a lane two meet, and one unexpectedly overthrowes the other. The time; as if in the night a man should kill his friend, supposing him his enemy. The manner; as if he should give one a small blow, without any great violence, and yet thereby slay him (for he knew not that one could have dyed by so small a stroke.) The cause; as if one should minister a medicine for a cure, which might prove deadly and kill his patient.
Of all these particulars together, no man can bee ignorant, except hee that is mad (or a very Idiot.) But whosoever is ignorant of the most of these, or in the principall of them, is accounted to doe things through ignorance. And the principall among such circumstances, are; Wherefore it was done; and What was done. That is to say; the cause, and the matter it selfe.