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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of things done voluntarily; and the definition of such actions.
OF those things which are done by constraint, there being two sorts; the one done through ignorance, and the other by compulsiō; the thing which is voluntary, doth on the contrary answer unto these two, and is neither done by compulsion, nor through ignorance.
That action is done without compulsion, wherof the beginning was in the doers; and an action is voide of ignorance, when none of those particular circumstances, are unknown, in which, and by which, the deed consisteth: And therefore wee joyne both together, and thus define it;
That is voluntary, whereof the beginning is in the doer, who knoweth all those particular circumstances, wherein the deed consisteth.
IIIt may now be questioned whether naturall things (as our concoction, and our growth) bee to be accounted voluntary: but, wee answer (as is before shewed) that such things are neither voluntary, nor of constraint because both voluntary things, and such as are by constraint, are esteemed among such things as are in our power; but our concoction, and our growth are not in our power: therefore though wee are ignorant of the particular circumstances; yet for that they are not in our power, they are neither to bee accounted things voluntary, nor of constraint.
But it hath been declared before, that things done of wrath or concupiscence, are voluntary; For when these passions are moderated, they are commended who so governe them; and such as offend in them, are for the same reproved, or hated. Moreover, pleasure or griefe ensue upon the doing of them; and the beginnings of these actions also, was in the doers themselves, because they were made able so to have governed their appetites, that they might not have beene lightly transported by them, if they had endeavoured according to their power.
By practise and custom such passions may be corrected; for if it were true, that they were absolutely by constraint, then doubtlesse neither unreasonable-creatures, nor infants, doe any thing voluntarily, (but by constraint; because they are moved by their appetite.)
But that is not so, for we see them goe to their food of their owne accord without any compulsion thereunto. It is they themselves which make speed unto it of themselves; yea, and not of ignorance, aswell as not of compulsion: For, they know their food; they are glad of it, when they see it; they presently hast toward it upon sight thereof, as unto a thing knowne; and are grieved if they misse of the same.
By this, a voluntary thing is assuredly knowne from that which is involuntary; even by the delight which followes the obtaining that which is desired; and by the griefe which followes, if the desire be made frustrate: for even beasts doe voluntarily covet; yea, and are voluntarily angry also, in regard anger hath some pleasure annexed thereunto.
He that will not acknowledg IIIthose things to be voluntary, whereunto we are moved by anger, and a vehement appetite; even he taketh away the morall-vertues; seeing they consist in a mediocritie in respect of passions. If our passions bee of constraint; then they also are forced actions which are done according to vertue; because the doing of them belongeth to our passions. But no man will account that to bee of constraint, which is done by reason, by choice, by our owne motion, by our owne desire, with a knowledge also of the particular circumstances and by having the very beginning of the action in our selves, which are evident proofes that the thing done is voluntary, as hath been formerly declared.
And now seeing wee have in many places made mention of our choice, and of such things as are in our power, wee will next discourse of such things as are in our choice.