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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
30. I. The definition of an involuntary act.
Such things as are done against our wil, are either done by constraint, or of ignorance. The beginning of those actions which are done against our will, by force, is without our selves; that is, some other thing, and not we our selves is the cause thereof: and therefore this is the definition of that thing which is done against our will, by force. It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it; and he which is forced thereunto doth nothing to further the same of his owne will. Wee meane, in this place, by the beginning, the cause-effecting the thing done.
IIHereupon it may bee questioned, when Shipmen cast their lading into the sea, when they are endangered by a tēpest; (or when a man is contented to suffer or doe some dishonest thing to save his friend or his country) whether these actions may be said to bee done against their will, or no. And according to this clause added to the definition (Hee that is forced, doth nothing to further the matter of his owne will) these actions do seeme to be voluntary; because to the executing of such things, the actors doe of themselves move their instrumentall parts, even of their owne accord.
Such is their case who cast their lading into the Sea; and theirs who offer themselves to abide any shame or danger to bring to passe a greater good, as did Zeno, who bitt off his owne tongue, and spit it out into the face of Dionysius the tyrant, because he would not utter unto him what was to bee kept secret; or as did Anaxarchus the Philosopher, who chose to be tormented unto death, by being rowled up together like a wheele, rather then hee would disclose the secret of his friend unto Nicareon the Tyrant.
Therefore, generally, when a man either chooseth a lesse evill, through feare of some greater evil; or, when a man accepts the lesse Good, in hope of a greater Good, (which he cannot otherwise attaine according as hee would) that thing which in such cases he doth or suffereth, is not utterly against his will: for he doth or suffers by his owne advise, and choice; and such things are to bee made choice of at that time, though they be not to bee chosen of their owne nature.
These are mixt actions, partly voluntary, and partly against our will: For, they are voluntary in respect of the circumstances; but they are involuntary, in regard of the actions themselves; and were it not for the circūstances, no man would make choice of doing such things.
Moreover the praise or dispraise which followes such actions, declare them to be voluntary: for neither praise nor dispraise follow such things as are done absolutely by constraint.
It is not easie to discerne what things are to be chosen before others, in some difficult cases: But for the most part, wee must choose rather to abide griefe, then commit any shamefull act; as did both Ioseph, and Susanna; and yet this holds not alwayes. For doubtlesse Origen fell grossely when he chose to sacrifice unto Idols, rather then to undergo that dishonestie which the Aethiopians would have put upon him.
We see therefore, that the discerning of such things is not easie; and we finde also, that it is very hard for them that have chosen, to continue in that which they have resolved upon; because perills to come doe not so amaze or discourage us, as those torments which are presently inflicted.
It so happeneth oftentimes, that they who have chosen well, doe depart from their owne choice by persecution; as it hath happened unto some, who when they should have suffered martyrdome, fell back from their stout and resolute beginnings, by being through tenderness unable to endure the trials, and the torments of adversity, when they were inflicted upon them.
IIILet no man imagine therefore, that either an inconstant falling away from a well chosen resolution, or an intemperate lust, or an angry rage, are to bee accounted among such offences as are to bee judged things done against our will; by reason there is an efficient cause of those actions without our selves: For though the beauty of an harlot made them that saw her to rush into the execution of an intemperate lust; and though such as are furiously angry, were so provoked thereunto by another man, that the first beginnings therof may bee truly affirmed to have beene without themselves; yet the actors of such things doe worke by themselves, and by their instrumentall parts: for which cause their actions come not within the definition of things done by constraint; even in regard they offered unto themselves the occasions, and beginnings of those actions; and suffered themselves to bee easily incaptivated by passions, through an evill conversation.
Therefore all they who doe such things, are worthily reprehended, as men voluntarily given to evill: and the evill is manifested to be voluntary, when they delight also in the deed; because every thing done by constraint, hath griefe annexed thereunto.
Thus much of things done against our will, by force; we will now treate of such involuntary actions, as are done through ignorance.