Library › Nemesius of Emesa › On the Nature of Man
On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of the uniting of the SOUL and BODY, and whether their Natures be altered, or…
Sect. 1
Our purpose is now to enquire, how between the SOUL and a lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union: For, the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull; and, it is much the more doubtfull, it Man consist not of these two parts onely, but of understanding also (as a distinct thing) which is the opinion of some. But, the greatest doubt of all, ariseth in this respect, that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence, are joyned all together in the making of that one; seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing, are (usually) so altered that they remaine not the same they were before, as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements.
How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL, remaine still a Bodie? or, how can the SOUL being incorporeall, and having a substance of his owne, be united with the BODIE, and become a part of the Living-creature, preserving still his owne proper substance, without corruption and confusion?
It seemes to be no way else possible, but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other, either become altered one with the other, or corrupted with each other, as the Elements are; or else, (to avoid those absurdities) that they should not be truly united; but, be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce, or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe, or at best be so mixed, as wine and water.
But, we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL, that the Soul cannot be laid (as it were) along by the Bodie; because, if it should be so, that part onely of the body should have life in it, which joyneth neare unto the soule; and that the part which the soule toucheth not, should be without life.
Moreover, wee cannot say, that two sundry things placed one beside the other, (as two pieces of timber, two iron wedges, or such like) are one and the same thing. And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water, wee know it corrupts both the one and the other; for there doth remaine neither pure water, nor pure wine, after such a mixture.
Yet this mixture of wine and water, is but (as it were) a laying of them one beside another, though our senses be not able to apprehend the same, because they are hindred from perceiving it, by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed. For, the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other, by a sponge dipped in oyle, or by paper, either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine. But, indeed, it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other, those things which are exactly united.
If therefore, the parts of MAN be neither united, nor placed one beside the other, nor mixed together, as aforesaid; what reason should move us to say, that one Living creature is made of these two parts, a Soul and a bodie?
It was the consideration hereof, which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body; but, that he was a Soule having the use of the Body, and to whom the Body served as a garment. But, even in affirming that, he occasioned as much doubting; for, how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment, seeing a Coat, is not all one with him that wears it?
But Amonius, who was IImaster to Plotinus thus dissolved this question: even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them (and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting) and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption, when they bee united, as those things do, which are but laid along one by another.
It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together, must of necessity suffer alterations by their union, and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto; because, they are thereby changed into other Bodies, as are the Elements making compound bodies; or as nourishment, being changed into blood; or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh, and other parts of the Bodie.
But things intelligible, may bee united, and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue. For, it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things, to bee altered in substance; but, either it departeth away, or is brought to nothing, and so can admit no alteration.
The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted, or brought to nothing; for, then it could not be immortall. It is also life it selfe; and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture: For, if it should be changed in the union, it should be altered from being life any more; and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto? All these arguments considered, it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body.
Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered; it followes necessarily therupon, that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things; so likewise, the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted; and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other.
That they are neverthelesse perfectly united, is manifested by this, that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature: For, the whole man grieveth as one creature, if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other, (to the SOUL or to the Body.)
And, it is as plaine, that they remaine united without confusion, in that the soule being separated (after a sort) from the Body when wee bee asleepe (and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps, and only breathing into the same, as it were, certaine vapours of life, least it should utterly perish) doth worke by it selfe, in dreames, whilest the Body sleepeth; foreseeing things to come, and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible.
The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation, & enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things. For, even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body, and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things.
For, being without body, it separates it self from the whole body, as things which are therewithall corrupted; and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion: And keeping it selfe one and alone, changeth that wherein it abideth, by the life which is contained in it selfe; and yet is not changed by the same.
For, as the Sun, so soon as it appeareth, changes the ayre into light; so making it light some, and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre, that it is united with the same, and yet not confoūded therewith: Even so, the soul being united with the Body, remaines without confusion therwith; differing in this onely, that the Sunne being a Body, and circumscribed within the compasse of Place, is not himselfe in every place where his light is, but (as fire in the wood, or as the flame in a candle) is confined to a certaine place.
IIIIt is not so with the soul. For, being void of all Body, and not contained within the limits of any place, it passeth all and whole, through it own whole light, and through the whole Body, wherein it is; neither is any part of it illuminated thereby, wherein it is not fully and wholly present. Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell, nor compassed in by the same; but the Body is rather in the soule, and is thereby held in and fastned together.
For, intelligible things (such as the soul is) are not hindred by bodily things; but, enter, and pierce, and passe through every corporeall thing, and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place. Things intellectuall, have their being in places also intelligible; yea they are either in themselves, or else in such intellectuall things, as are above themselves.
The soul is otherwhile in it selfe; as, when it reasoneth or considereth of things; and otherwhile in the understanding; as, when it conceiveth any thing: And when it is said to bee in the body, it is not said to be there, as in place; but, to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body; and to bee present with it in such a sense, as, God is said to be in us.
For, wee say that the soul is bound (as it were) by a certaine disposition and inclination, as the lover is to his beloved: not bound in place, or as bodies are bound; but by the habituall bands of affection. And indeed, seeing it hath neither magnitude, nor massinesse, nor parts, how can it be enclosed by a speciall place? Or within what place can that bee contained, which hath no parts? Where place is, there must needs bee a massinesse; because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing; and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth.
Now, if any man shall thereupon conclude, that his soule is in Alexandria, and in Rome, and in every place; let him know, that even in so saying, hee includeth a Place. For, to be in Alexandria, or generally to be here, or there, or any where, pertaineth unto a place; whereas the soul is no where (no not in the body) as in a place; but habitually; because, (as is aforesaid) it cannot be contained within a place.
For this cause, when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place, or to such things as are in place; wee turne the word from his proper use, and say abusively, that such a thing is there, or there; by reason of the operation which it there hath; taking the name of place, for the inclination, or working in a place. And, whereas we should rather say, it there worketh, we say, There it is.
Sect. 2
I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood, how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body; and wherein it is unlike thereunto. II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie, confuting himselfe, and others, who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood, and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union. III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body; and shewes that as it was meerely, of Gods good pleasure, to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood; So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God, that this union should be without mixture or confusion.
That which is last aforesaid, agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union, which is betweene GOD the WORD, and the Man-hood; by which union, the two Natures being united, remained neverthelesse without confusion; and so, also, that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity: And, yet, this uniting is not altogether such, as is betweene the soul and the body: For, the soul being in the number of multiplied things, suffers (after a sort) with the Body, in such things as happen thereunto, and by reason of their mutuall necessities, and conversation together, both holds it in, and is also held in, by the same.
But, GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered, by that union, which unites the divinity and humanity together (nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other) imparts his God-head unto them, without participating of their frailties; and becommeth one with them, still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was, before such an uniting.
This is a strange and mysterious temperature & uniting: For, Hee is tempered with them, and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion, without confusion, without corruption, and without change: Neither suffering any thing with them; but, only helping, and furthering them: nor being corrupted nor altered by them; but, greatly encreasing them, without any diminution in himselfe; because, hee is altogether without mutation, without confusion, and without possibility of changing.
Hereof may Porphyrie IIhimselfe beare witnesse, who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST (for, the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves.) This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words.
It is not, then (saith he) to be judged a thing impossible, that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE, and be part of that ESSENCE, perfecting also the same, and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE, both being ONE with that other thing, and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe: yea, and (which is more then this) changing those things wherein it is, by the presence thereof, and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh, and yet nothing altered in it SELFE.
Now, Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body: and if his reason hold good, in the SOUL, in regard it is an incorporeall substance, it holds true much rather, in GOD the Word, who is verily without bodie, and also utterly void of composition. And this doth manifestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood, as many of the Grecians have done; Jeasting, and deriding at it, as impossible, improbable, and absurd, that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature; for, it is here discovered, that they may be opposed in this argument, by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves.
The opinion of some (especially of the Eunomians) is this, that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance, but by the powers of either (Nature:) For it is not (say these) their substances which are united and tempered together; but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers.
Now, they affirme (according to Aristotle) that the Senses are the powers of the body (meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof) and therefore, in their judgement, the Divine powers being tempered with the Senses, is cause of that uniting: But, wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body: For, wee have already manifestly declared, what things belong properly to the Body, what things to the SOUL only; and what to the SOUL and body both together: And, we therupon concluded, that the Senses, which worke by the instruments of the Body, are to bee reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One.
These things considered,IIIit is most agreeable to reason, wee should affirme (according to the nature of incorporeall-things) and as is aforesaid, that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion; and in such maner, that the more Divine nature, is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature; but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine.
For a nature which is purely incorporeall, can passe without stop thorow all things, whereas nothing hath passage thorow that: By passing through all things, it is united; and in regard nothing passes through the same, it remaines void of mixture, and without confusion.
It is not rightly affirmed therefore (though many excellent men be of this opinion) that no reason else can be given, why the union, whereof wee have treated, should bee after such a manner, but, onely, because it pleased God it should so be: For the very nature of the things is cause thereof.
We may justly say, that it came to passe meerely by GOD’s good pleasure, and choise, that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe: But, it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD (though it be also his good pleasure it should be so) but of the proper nature of the Godhead, that when it is united, it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood.
Wee will speake nothing of the degrees of soules, nor of their ascending and descending, mentioned by Origen. For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same; neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians.