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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. The severall and different Opinions of the Ancients concerning the SOVL, as whether it…
Sect. 1
Exceeding great variance is discovered among the old Philosophers in their discourses of the SOUL; insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter. Democritus and Epicurus, and the whole sect of the Stoicks doe peremptorily affirme that the SOVL is a Bodie; and those very men who affirme the SOVL to be a Bodie, dissent one from another in declaring the Essence of it.
The Stoicks affirm, that it is a certain Blast, hot and fiery. Critias holds, that it is bloud. Hippon the Philosopher, will have it to be water, Democritus thinks it is fire; and his opinion is, that the round Formes of indivisible-bodies or Atomes being incorporated, by ayre and fire, do make up the Soul. Heraclitus conceives that the Soul of the whole frame of the World is a certaine breathing out of the vapours, from moist things; and, that the Soul which is in living-creatures, doth proceed both from exhalations without themselves, and from exhalations, also, within them; and being of the same kind, of which they themselves are.
Againe (on the contrary part) there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a Body, or Bodily-substance. Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a substance and immortall; Some, that it is without a Bodie, and neither a substance nor immortall.
Thales, who was the first of that opinion, held that the SOUL was alwaies in motion, and had that motion from it selfe. Pythagoras thought that it was a NUMBER moving it selfe. Plato affirmed that it was a substance (to be conceived in mind) that received motion from it self, according to NUMBER and HARMONY. Aristotle taught that it was the first continuall-motion of a BODIE-NATURALL, having in it those Instrumentall parts, wherein was possibility of life. Dinarchus took it to be an Harmony of the foure Elements; not a Harmony made of sounds, but as it were a tunable temperature and agreement, of hot & cold, moist & dry things, in the Bodie. But, it is without doubt that all the best of these doe agree in this, that the SOUL is a substance; Aristotle and Dinarchus excepted, who affirme that it is no substance at all.
Besides all these, some were of opiniō that there was but one and the same SOUL belonging to all things; which was by smal portions distributed to all particular things; and, then gathered into it self againe: of which opinion were the Manichees and certain others. Some likewise imagined the Soules were many, and of differing sorts; Some affirmed that there was both one universall, and many particular SOULS; and therefore it cannot be, but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length, seeing I am to disprove so many opinions.
IITherefore, to confute in generall all those together, who affirme that the Soul is a corporeall essence, it shall be sufficient to alledge that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by Numinius the Pythagorist, and by Amonius the Master of Plotinus, who thus affirme:
All Bodies, being by their proper nature mutable, and such as may be utterly dispersed and divided into innumerable parts (and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and dispersed) have need of something to close them in, to bring them together; to knit them into one; and (as it were) to hold them fast united: And, this we say is done by the SOUL.
Now if the SOUL be corporeall, (let it be what Body you please) yea, though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts, what will you say holds that together, as that knitteth the Bodie in One? For, as we declared before, every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together; yea the Bodie of this SOUL, that knits together our visible BODIE, (if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL) and the next to that also, infinitely, it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together, untill an incorporeall-essence were found out.
If they answer, as the Stoicks doe, that, there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies, extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body: That the motion tending outward, effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body; and, that the motion tending inward, is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof; wee will then aske them (seeing every motion doth proceed from some power) what kinde of power it is, which that motion hath? in what consisteth it? and what gives essence thereunto?
If this power bee a certaine matter (which the Greekes call Hylen) wee will use the same reasons against them, which wee objected before. If they say it is not matter, but a materiall thing, (for matter and materiall things thus differ; That which hath matter in it, is called a materiall thing) wee then aske them, whether that which hath matter in it, be likewise matter, or void of matter? If they say it is matter, we demand how it can be both materiall and matter? If they answer, that it is not matter, then they must grant it to be void of matter, and if it be void of matter, wee will easily prove it to be no Body; because, every body hath matter in it.
If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them, and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body, hath in it also the three Dimensions, and therefore must necessarily be a Body; wee will then thus answer them; It is true, that all BODIE’S have in them the three Dimensions, but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY. For place, and Quality which in themselves have no Body, have accidentally, a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude.
In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe, is utterly void of the Dimensions; but, accidentally it hath Dimensions; because the Body (in which it is) 〈…〉 〈…〉 having in it the three Dimensions, wee so conceive it, together with the Body, as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions.
We argue further, and say thus: Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe, or from within. If the motion bee from without it selfe, it must then be void of life: if it be from within it selfe, it must be indued with life: now, it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life, or without life (one of which must necessarily be affirmed, if the Soule bee a corporeall substance) therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence.
Againe, the SOUL, if it be nourished, it is nourished by that which is void of Body (for, knowledge is the nourishment thereof) but, no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless, therefore, the SOUL cannot be a Body. Xenocrates thus concluded this argument: If (said hee) the SOUL be not nourished, it cannot be a corporeal-substance; because, the Body of every living-creature must be nourished.
Thus much in generall,IIIin confutation of all those who generally affirm, that the SOUL is a bodily thing. Now, we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood, or Breath; because, when either Blood or Breath is taken away, the living-creature dyeth.
Wee will not say (as some well accounted of have written) that, part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth, if the SOUL be the Blood: for, that were but a slender answer. In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole, the part remaining is the same with the whole: Whether the water bee much or little, it is every way perfect water. In like maner, gold, silver, and every other thing, whose parts do not essentially differ from each other, are still the same, as is afore said: And even so, that part of blood which remaineth (of what quantity soever) may be called the SOUL (aswell as the whole quantity) if the blood be the SOUL.
We, therfore, will rather answer them thus: If that be rightly accounted the SOUL, upon whose taking away, the death of the living creature ensues; then, should it needs bee, that flegme, and the two chollers must be also the SOUL, seeing, if any one of these faileth, it brings the living-creature to his death. The like falleth out in the Liver, in the Braine, in the Heart, in the Stomach, the Reines, the Entrails, and in many other parts, whereof if you bereave a living-creature, it will immediatly perish.
Moreover, there are many things without blood, which have life in them, neverthelesse; as some smooth and gristly fishes; some also of a softer kind, to wit, Sepiae, Teuthides, and Smyli (as the Greekes call them) and Lobsters, Crabs, Oysters, and all shel-fish, whether they have hard or soft shells. Now if these things have a living-Soule in them (as we know they have) and yet are void of blood, then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL.
Against those who say that water is the Soule, many things may bee said to disprove their opinion, though water helps to quicken and nourish all things; and though it bee (as they say) impossible to live without water.
Wee cannot live without nourishment, and therefore if their assertion bee true, wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall, and every particular nourishment is the SOUL. And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water, wee finde the contrary to bee probable; for it is written of some Aegles, and of Partridges, that they live without drinke.
And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre? Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long, whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire.
And yet, neither is Aire the SOUL: For, there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire; as all Insectae (riveted creatures) such as Bees, Wasps, and Ants; as also all bloodlesse creatures, all those which live in the waters, and such as have no Lungs. For, none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire. The proposition is true also, if it be converted, There is no creature having Lungs, which doth not breath aire.
Sect. 2
I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick (affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall) are here confuted logically and by demonstration. II. Chrysippus (intending to maintaine the like opinion) is here, likewise answered, and his Fallacies discovered. III. A confutation of their Tenet also, who affirme that the SOUL is an Harmony.
Seeing certaine reasons of some account, are divulged by Cleanthes the Stoick, and by Chrysippus (to prove the SOUL a corporeall. substance) wee will here deliver somewhat in answer of them; and it shall be the same which the Platonists have thereunto replyed heretofore.
Cleanthes composeth a syllogisme in this manner;
There is (saith hee) a likenesse betweene us and our parents, not in respect of the Body onely, but in regard also, of the SOVL, as in Passions, Manners, and Affections: now it pertaineth to a body to have in it likenesse and unlikenesse; and likenesse and unlikenesse cannot belong to things void of Bodie; Therefore the Soul is a bodily-thing.
It is here to be observed, first, that he proveth things universall by things particular (which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick.) Next, whereas he saith that likenesse and unlikenesse cannot pertaine to any thing void of bodie, it is false. For wee know that Numbers, which have their side-numbers answering in proportion, are like one to another, as the side-numbers to sixe and to foure and twentie. The side-numbers to sixe are two, and three: The side numbers to foure and twenty are foure, and sixe. Now, there is like proportion of two in respect of four; and of three in respect of sixe: For they have a double proportion, each in respect of other; foure being twice as much as two, and sixe twice as much as three. Thus it appears that Nūbers are like unto Nūbers, & yet Numbers are no bodily thing.
Likewise, Figures (in Geometrie) are like unto Figures, so many of them as have both their corners equall, & their sides which inclose their equall-corners, answering one another in proportion: and even the Platonists themselves will confesse, that such Figures are no Bodily-things.
Moreover, as it is a propriety in the predicament of Quantity, that a thing should be equall, or unequall; So, also, it is a propriety in the predicament of Quality, that things should be like, or unlike. Now the predicament of Quality is an Incorporeall thing; Therefore, a thing incorporeall may be like unto another thing, that is incorporeall.
Cleanthes, thus frameth another Argument: No Incorporeall thing (saith he) can suffer together with a thing corporeall; neither can a bodily-thing, suffer with such a thing as hath no body; but, things corporeall, only, may suffer one with another. Now it is evident, that if the body be diseased, and wounded, the SOVL suffereth grief with it; The Bodie suffereth also with the SOVL; for, when the mind is afflicted by shame, the Bodie blusheth, and when the minde feareth, the body looketh pale. Therefore the SOVL is a corporeall thing.
One of his Assumptions is false; and he taketh unto himself that which no man granteth. For whereas he saith, that no Incorporeal thing can suffer with a thing having a bodie; what if this be true onely in the SOVL? This is as if we should argue thus; No living-creature moves the upper jaw; But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw; Therefore, a Crocodile is no living-creature. The major of this proposition is false; because, in saying, No living-creature moves the upper-jaw, hee taketh as granted that which is denied: for, behold the Crocodile both moveth his upper-jaw, and is also a living-creature. The like arguing useth he, who saith, that Nothing, void of body, suffereth together with a bodily-thing; for, he taketh unto himself, in his negation, that which lieth in question.
But, if we should grant (for argument sake) that no Incorporeall-thing, doth suffer together with a thing-corporeall; yet, that which is inferred thereupon, is not fully confessed, (to wit) that the Soul suffereth with the Body, if it be sick, or wounded: For, it is yet in controversie whether it be the Body onely that suffereth pain; which having taken sense from the Soul, leaves the same insensible of sufferings; or whether the Soul be grieved together with the Bodie. The former opinion hath hitherto been most generally received among learned men; and therefore, Cleanthes ought not to have made his propositions of things in question; but, of such onely as are quite out of doubt: for in doing otherwise he in vaine laboureth to demonstrate that, for which he contendeth.
And yet (to make the fashood of his Assumption more evident) it might be proved, that some things void of body, doe suffer together with such things as have body: For, Qualities being things-incorporeall, doe suffer with corporeall-things when they are altered: yea, both in the corruption of the body, and in the Generation of the same, the Quality thereof suffers change and alteration therewith.
IIChrysippus thus argueth. Death is a separation of the Soul from the Bodie: Now, nothing void of body is separated from a body; because, a thing incorporeall cannot be touched (or laid even along) by a corporeall-thing: But the Soul toucheth, and is equally touched by the body: and is also separated from the same: Therefore the Soul is a corporeall-essence.
Among these propositions, this is true, that death is a separation of the soul from the body: But, this, that a thing void of body cannot touch a body, is false, if it be generally spoken; and true, if it be affirmed of the soul. It is false; because, a Line which is an incorporeall-thing doth evenly touch a corporeall-essence, and is also separated from the same; as also whitenesse. Yet, in the Soul it is true; by reason the Soul doth not (so) touch the Bodie. For, if the Soul should (so) touch the body, it must needs follow that it must be laid (as it were) along by it. And if that be so, then it lieth along by the whole bodie (that is, by every part of the same) which is impossible. For, how can a whole body, lie along by every part of another body?
Or, if it should be that the Soul so touched the Bodie; then, the whole Creature should not have life: For, if it (so) touched the same, it would indeed consequently follow, that the Soul were a corporeall-essence; but, then, the thing made alive, should not have life in it, throughout every part of the same. And, contrariwise, if the whole living-creature hath life in it, then the Soul neither touches the Bodie, neither is it a bodily-thing. But, the whole living-creature hath life in it; therefore, neither doth the Soul touch it; neither is the Soul a bodily-thing; and, being a thing void of body; is, neverthelesse, separated from the bodie, (contrary to the proposition of Chrysippus.)
It is manifest, by what IIIhath been hitherto said, that the Soul is no corporeall-substance: it now remaines that we prove the same to be a substance. And, because Dinarchus defines the Soul to be an Harmonie; And Simmias, contradicting Socrates, affirmes the same; comparing the Soul to an harmonie, and the body to a Harp; we will here set downe the same confutations of them, which we finde in Plato’s Dialogue called Phaedon.
One of them is taken from what Plato had proved by things granted: For, he had demonstrated that when we doe learne, we doe but call to minde things that were ingraffed formerly in us: And therefore, taking this unto him (as a thing granted) hee thereupon confirmes his Argument in this maner;
If (saith hee) the learning of things be nothing else, but the recalling of them to minde; then, our soule had a being, before it was in the forme of MAN: Now, if it were a Harmony, it was not before the body, but came after it, when the body was harmoniously joyned together. Such of necessity must the composition bee, as the things are whereof the composition is made: For, composition is a certaine common joyning together of those things, which are compounded, having a harmony in the same: and, it cannot bee otherwise, in reason, but that the Harmony must follow, and not precede those things whereof it is compounded.
These matters considered, this saying, That the SOUL is an Harmony, is contrary to this other saying, That, the learning of things is the recordation of things: But the opinion concerning recordation (as is aforesaid) is true; even in their judgement who affirme the SOUL to bee an HARMONIE; therefore the SOUL is not a Harmony, according to their owne Principle.
Againe, the SOUL is a part repugnant to the body; and is in stead of a Ruler, exercising a government over the same. But Harmony neither exerciseth any government over the Body, neither is any way repugnant thereunto; therefore, the SOUL is not an Harmony.
Moreover, one Harmony may bee more or lesse Harmony then another, according as it is slackned or stretched forth, (wee meane not to bee understood as if we spoke of the very nature of Harmony; seeing it is impossible there should be intension and remission, in the very nature thereof,) but wee meane Harmony as it consisteth in joyning together of the notes: For, if a shrill and a base-sound, being matched together, shall afterward bee made more slack, there will bee a diversitie in the Harmony, by reason of joyning together of the notes, more or lesse reached forth, though they retain the same nature in the greatnesse of the sounds: But one SOUL is not more or lesse SOUL then another; therefore, the SOUL cannot be a Harmony.
Futhermore, the SOUL in that it receives contraries succeeding one another, is a substance and a subject: But, Harmony is a Quality, and in the subject Now the predicament of substance is one thing, and the predicament of Quality is another; therefore, the SOUL and Harmony are two distinct things. It is indeed, no absurdity, to say that the SOUL hath Harmony in it; howsoever, it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an Harmony: Because, though the SOUL hath vertues in the same, it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is vertue.
Sect. 3
I. It is here declared, that the SOUL is not (as Galen implicitly affirmeth) a Temperature in generall. II. It is here proved also, that the SOUL is no particular temperature or quality. III. And it is likewise demonstrated, that the SOUL is rather governesse of the temperatures of the Body, both ordering them, and subduing the Vices, which arise from the bodily-tempers.
Galen, hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL; yea, hee himselfe affirmeth plainly, in his writings of demonstration, that hee hath delivered nothing precisely of the same: But, it may bee collected by some of his expressions, that he could be best pleased to affirme that the SOUL is a temperature.
For, he saith, that the diversitie of manners followes the temperature of the Body, and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of Hippocrates: Wherein, if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh, then, doubtlesse, hee beleeveth also, that the SOUL is mortall: not the whole SOUL, but that onely which is irrationall; for, hee maketh a doubt concerning the reasonable soul, as his words declare.
Now, that the temperature of the Body cannot be the SOUL, it may be made evident by these reasons: First, every body, aswell that which hath life in it, as that which is void of life, is made of the temperature of the foure Elements (for, the temperature of these Elements make all Bodies) And if the SOUL bee the temperature of the body, there can be no body with out life: For, if the Soul be the temperature, then, every body hath life in it, because every body hath his temperatures. And if every Body hath life in it, then there is no body void of life: So, consequently, neither stone, nor timber, nor iron, nor any other thing can be without life.
But he did not meane,IIperhaps, to affirme in generall, that every temperature of the body was the SOUL; but rather, that some such, or such a temperature. Wee, then, demand what temperature it is which maketh a living-creature, and standeth instead of the SOUL? For, let him name what temperature soever hee can devise, we will finde him out the like in things without life.
There are (as hee himselfe hath declared in his Booke intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS) nine temperatures; eight distempered; and one in good temper; by which (as he likewise affirmeth) every man is tempered, whose temperature keepeth a meane. But by the other distemperatures other living-creatures are composed (every one according to the severall kinde thereof) with a certaine intension and remission, to the more and to the lesse. Yea, and all the nine temperatures are found also more or lesse in things void of life; as he himselfe hath taught, in his booke of simple-medicaments.
Moreover, if the SOUL be a temperature, then is the SOUL subject to alteration; for, the temperatures are altered according to the diversitie of Ages, Seasons, and Dyets: And, if the SOUL be altered, then wee have not at all times the same SOUL; but, a Soule varied according to our temperatures; sometime the soule of a Lion, sometime of a Sheepe, and sometime of other creatures, which were absurdly affirmed.
Againe, our temperature doth not oppose it selfe against any lusts of our bodies, but rather helps to provoke them, or effect them, for, it is that which stirreth up the desires: But, the SOUL bendeth it selfe against those desires; therefore our temperature is not the SOUL.
Furthermore, the temperature is a quality; and a qualitie may be in the subject, or absent from it without the destruction of the same subject: Now, if our temperature bee our soule, it will then follow (by the reason afore-mentioned) that the soule may be separated from the body (which is the subject thereof) without the destruction of the same. But, this is universally knowne to be false; therefore, the SOUL can be neither temperature nor qualitie.
None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a living-creature, into the contrary thereof, and yet preserve the living-creature, then, in fire to change the nature of heat into coldnesse, and yet still continue the fire. But it appeareth plainly that our temperature doth alter into the contrary; (& that such as Galen was are they, who change our temperatures, by their art of Physick. Therefore the soule (which is the essence of a living-creature) cannot be the temperature.
Neither is the Soule a quality of the body: For, the qualities of every body are subject to sense; But the soule is not subject to sense, but to understanding onely, and therefore it is not a Quality.
Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits, accompanied with flesh and sinewes, and such other things, is strength. And, that the good temperature of hot and cold, dry and moist things, is health. And that the measurable proportion of the members, with a fresh colour, is cause of the beauty which is in the Body. Now, if the soul be a certaine harmony, of health, and strength, and beauty; It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him, can neither be sick, nor weake, nor deformed.
But, wee see by often experience, that even while the living-soule continueth in them, many men are deprived, not only of one, but of all these good temperatures; insomuch, that the very same man is deformed, and weak, and sick all at once. Therefore, the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie.
Some will aske, perhaps,IIIhow it comes to passe, (if the soule be not the temperature of the body) that men are vitious or vertuous, according to their naturall constitutions and complexions and they may demand also, whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature. We answer, that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature: For, as there bee some naturally healthfull, or sickly, by reason of their constitution; So, othersome, naturally abounding in bitter choller, are froward; and some other cowardly, or leacherous, (more or lesse according to their complexions.)
But, there bee some, who overcome these naturall inclinations, and by getting the victory over them, doe evidently manifest, that these temperatures may bee suppressed. Now, that which overcommeth is one thing, and that which is overcome is another thing: Therefore, the temperature is also one thing, and the soule (which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature) is another thing, and not the same.
The body being an instrument which the soule useth, if it bee well fitted for the same, is a helper unto the soule; and she the better useth it to her own contentment. But, if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule’s use, it becommeth her hinderance, and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument. Yea, so much, that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same, she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument; even as a musitian misseth of true musick, when his harp is out of tune.
The soule therefore must be carefull of the body, and make it a fit instrument for her selfe: which may be done by ordering it according to Reason, and by accustoming the same to good manners; as in Harmony, otherwhile slackning, and sometime winding up, according as necessity requires: By the neglect whereof, shee her selfe, may else (as it often happeneth) become as faultie, and as perverse as her Instrument.
Sect. 4
I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes: Hee shewes what 〈…〉 is, and the defects of Aristotles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live, before the SOVL commeth unto it, as Aristotle hath also affirmed. III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe, nor accidentally moved, nor bred in the Body; as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered.
Aristotle affirming that the Soule is 〈…〉 a perpetuall motion, is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them, who say that the SOUL is a quality. But, first, let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈…〉, (which is to say) a perpetuall motion.
He divideth a substance into three parts: The first is matter (which is as it were the subject) and this matter is in it selfe nothing, but a generating power, out of which another thing may bee formed.
The second part of the Essence, is forme, (or speciall kinde) by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme.
The third part, consisteth both of matter and forme united together, and endued with life: The matter being a thing in possibility only, and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes. That is to say, either as you consider of a science, or of a contemplation according to the science; as a habit; or, as working by that habit.
It is considerable as a science; because, in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde (as wee may call it) both of sleepe and of waking. This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation; and sleepe represents the having of this habit, without any working thereby.
The Science, is, before working according to that science; and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈…〉, that is, the first continued motion: The working according to this forme, he names 〈…〉 the second continued motion. As for example:
The eye consisteth of a materiall subject, and of a certaine forme. This materiall subject, is in the eye it selfe; even that which containeth the sight (I meane the matter of the eye) and this matter is equivocally called the eye. But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth: A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned, hath yet, an aptnesse to receive such a motion: Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL. When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye; and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body, it perfects the living-creature.
So then, in a perfect living-creature, neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie, neither the Body without the Soul: For, the SOUL is not the Body it selfe; but, it is the SOUL of the BODY: and therefore, it is in the Body, yea, and in such a kinde of body: for, it hath not an existence by it self.
Aristotle first calls the possible (inferiour) part of the soul, by the Name of the soul, severing the Reasonable-part from it, wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together, and not have given his judgement of the whole, by a part, much lesse by the weakest part there of.
Aristotle hath affirmed IIalso, that the body hath an aptnesse to live, even before the soul commeth unto it: For he saith, that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live.
Now, the body which hath in it self a possibility to live, must first be actually a body, before it receives that form: For, such a body is a matter void of all qualities. Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self, should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it.
If it be a bodie, and hath in it self, no other being, but in possibility only; how can that which is a bodie but in possibility, have a possibility of life in it self? Though in other things, it is possible, that a man should have somewhat which he never useth; yet in the soul it is impossible: For, the soul doth not cease to worke, even in them that are asleep; but, a man, even in sleeping, is nourished, & groweth. and seeth visions, and breathes, which is the chiefest symptome of life.
It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live, but, it must needs have life actually in it: For, indeed, it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul, (it is planted together with the Soul) and it is in the bodie by participation.
If therefore any man shall affirme, that Health answereth proportionably to Life; we will reply that in saying so, he talketh not of the life of the SOUL but of the body, and so useth a sophisticall reasoning: For, the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another; but, in the substance, which is the forme, that cannot be possible; Because, if the difference, which is the Form, should be altered, the living creature would be altered also.
It is not therefore, the substantiall forme, which receiveth contraries; but the substance which is the subject; that is to say, the bodily-substance: And therefore also the Soul cannot be, by any means, the continued motion of the bodie; but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe, and incorporeall; for that it receiveth contraries one after another, (as vice and vertue) whereof the very Forme, by it self, is not capable.
Furthermore, Aristotle IIIsaith, that the Soul being a continued-motion, unmoveable of it self, is moved accidentally; and, that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing; because we see by common experience, that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us.
But, though Beautie, which is unmoveable in it self, may move us, (as hee saith) yet, the Beautie so moving us, is a thing by nature, apt enough to be moved, & not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable. Therefore, if the body had any selfe-motion, it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable: But, it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable, should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion, except it receive it from the soul? seeing it cannot have any motion from it self?
It appeares, therefore, that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion, hee shewed us not the first, but the second. For, if he had moved that which of it self is not moved, he had then made the first-motion. But, if (otherwise) he move that which is moved of it self, hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth.
From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie? If he say the Elements are moved of themselves; in regard some of them are naturally light, & some heavy; It is not so: For, if levity & weightinesse were kinds of motion; then, light and heavy things would never leave moving. But, they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place. Therefore, lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion, but qualities of the Elements.
If it were granted (that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion) how can the Qualities of Reasoning, of Judging, and of holding Opinion, be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse? If they be not effects of these; neither are they effects of the Elements; and if not of the Elements, then also not of the Bodies.
Beside, if the soul be moved accidentally, and the bodie of it self; then should the bodie be moved of it self, although it had no soul; and if that were possible, then it might be a living-creature without a soul. But, these things are absurd; and absurd therefore is the former opinion.
Moreover, it is likewise untruely affirmed, that every thing which is moved naturally, is moved also violently; and that whatsoever is moved violently, is moved by nature. For, the World being moved naturally, is not moved violently. Neither is it true, that such things as are moved naturally, doe rest naturally also: For, the World, and the Sunne, and the Moone, are naturally moved, and yet cannot rest naturally: In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion, they cannot rest naturally: For Rest is the destruction of the Soul, & of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion.
It is herewith considerable also, that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter, (viz.) how the bodie (whose nature is to be easily dispersed) can be knit together, (if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance).
Sect. 5
I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras; nor as Xenocrates understands it. II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul, these words, created (or ingendred) in the Bodie; and the absurdity thereupon insuing. III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation, & Providence, &c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules.
Pythagoras, whose custome it was, by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God, and all other things to NUMBERS, defined the soul, also, to be a number moving it self. Him, Xenocrates imitated; not as though the soul were number; but, for that it is in things numbred; and in such as are multiplyed; and, for that it is the soul which discernes things; and, because, likewise it putteth (as it were) upon every thing, certaine formes, and distinctions.
(For, it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another, and shewes how they differ; both by the diversity of their Formes, and by the multitude of their number; thereby causing things to be contained in number: And, therefore, betweene the soul and numbers, there is some affinity.)
He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe: And, that it is not a number, wee may thus prove; Number, is in the predicament of quantity; But, the soul is not in the predicament of quantity, but in the predicament of substance; Therfore, the soul is not a number. Yea though they would never so faine, that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding, it will bee proved otherwise, as it shall hereafter bee declared.
Againe, the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another; but, so hath not number; Therefore the SOUL is not a Number. Againe, a number is increased by putting more and more unto it, but, the Soul taketh no such increase. Againe, a number is either even or odd; but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd. Againe, the SOUL hath motion of it selfe; but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable. Againe, a number remaining one and the same in nature, is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers: But, the Soul remaining one and the same in substance, doth change his qualities, altering from ignorance to knowledge, and from vice to vertue; therefore (all these particulars considered) the SOVL is not a number.
These were the ancient IIPhilosophers opinions concerning the SOUL. But Eunomius defined it to be a SVBSTANCE void of body, and created in the body, agreeing therein both with Plato and Aristotle. For, he took these words, a substance void of body, out of Plato; and these, created in the body, from Aristotle: not considering (though hee was otherwise very quick witted) that he endeavours to knit those things into One which can by no meanes be united together.
For, every thing that is engendred both bodily and in time, is corruptible and mortall. To this the doctrine and judgement of Moses is agreeable. For, in describing the Creation of things subject unto sense, hee did not therein deliver in expresse words, that the nature of things intelligible were then made. But, some (though othersome are not of their opinion) insisting upon conjectures, are of that minde.
Now if any man suppose that the SOUL was made after the body; because it was put into the body, after the same was fashioned, he erreth wide from the truth. For, neither doth Moses say, that the SOUL was at the same time created when it was brought into the body, neither doth any reason perswade thereunto.
Eunomius therefore, might aswell have said that the Soul is mortall, as doth Aristotle, and the Stoicks, as affirme it is engendred in the body. For, if he will say the soul is an incorporeall Essence; hee should have refused to say that, it was created in the body; lest hee give men occasion to thinke the soule mortall, and utterly void of Reason.
Beside, it seemes by his opinion, that the World is not yet replenished; but, is at this present (as it were) no more then halfe perfected, and stands every day in want of some additions. For, there are every day added unto it, at the least five times ten thousand intelligible substances. And (which is most unreasonable) hee seemeth to beleeve, that when the number of soules is finished, then the whole world shall bee dissolved, and the last not come to light before the day of the generall resurrection.
What can be more contrary to reason, then to imagine that the world shall be destroyed, assoone as it is fully furnished? It were like the play-games of little children so to do. For when they have made any workes or devises upon the sands, they usually tread them out againe as soone as they have done them.
Now if any shall hereunto IIIreply, that the soules are now made by Providence and not by Creation; and that there is no new substance brought into the world (whensoever any body is replenished with a soule) nor any other Essence, but the same multiplyed, by Providence, which was before; doubtlesse, they know not the difference between Creation and Providence.
For it is the speciall worke of Providence to preserve the substance of corruptible living creatures, by breeding them one of another. I meane, here, all such corruptible living-creatures as are bred by generation, and excepting those which are generated by some rotten-matter; for, the succession of such, is preserved, (by the same providence) by generating them of some other putrifaction.
But the chiefe operation of Creation is, to make things of nothing. If, therfore, the SOULS bee made one of another: It will also follow, that they are corruptible, like those other creatures, which are made successively one of another, according to their kindes. If contrariwise, the SOULS be made of nothing; then their making commeth by Creation; and in so affirming, we deny that place of Moses: God ceased from all his workes. But both of these opinions are absurd; Therefore, the Soules are not now made. For, that saving of the Scripture; My Father worketh, &c. by the judgement even of Eunomius himselfe, is to be understood not of the workes of Creation, but of Providence.
Apollinarius held opinion that Soules were engendred one of another, as Bodies are; and that the SOUL proceeds by succession from the first Man, unto all men descending from him, according to the bodily succession; therein dissenting both from those who conceive them to have beene from the beginning (as it were) stored up; and from those also who thinke they are daily created. For, in contradiction to these tenets, they affirme, that by them God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children. And they further say that these words of Moses, God ceased from all his works, &c. should be untrue, if God continueth to create Souls.
In answer hereunto, we have already shewed, that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another: For, therefore onely they generate and are generated, that the race of corruptible things might be preserved. And therefore, Apollinarius, must either deny the successive generation of Souls; or by holding such a generation, he must (consequently at least) necessarily affirme that the Soul is mortall. Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery; let us leave that unto the Divine Providence, whereof we are ignorant. But, if we may presume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence, it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child so begotten may be some way profitable, permitteth such a bodie also to be furnished with a Soul, as hath been testified unto us by the child which was begotten of David on the wife of Vrias.
Sect. 6
I. The opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL, and the absurdity and contradictions thereof. II. The judgement of Plato touching one generall SOUL, and many particular SOULS; The office of the SOUL; and the difference betweene things that live, and Living-creatures, is here also declared. III. Of the Transmigration of SOULS according to the various fancies of the Grecian Philosophers.
Now, it followes that we examine the opinion of the Manichees concerning the SOUL. For, they say truely, that the SOUL is a substance, both immortall and incorporeall: But, they adde also, that there is but one onely Soul for all things; and that it is parted, and (as it were) peecemeal distributed unto all particular bodies, as well to bodies inanimate, as to those which are indued with life.
They affirme likewise that some bodies receive the same in more ample sort, and some in a lesse measure. Things indued with life in a larger proportion; Things void of life, in the lesse; And, heavenly things in the most abundant manner; and that the particular soules, are portions of that soul which is universall.
Now, if they had affirmed the soul to have been so divided, as that it had not been divided into parts, but after some such sort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers, the error had been the more tolerable. But, their opinion is, that the very substance of the soul is divided into parts; and (which is most harsh) they will have it to be accounted properly among the Elements, and to be distributed together with the Elements, in the making up of bodily-things; and for the collecting of them againe into one, when they are dissolved, as water is divided into certain portions, and then mingled again all together.
They are of opinion, likewise, that (after the dissolution of their bodies) the pure soules, being light, doe ascend unto the light, and that souls which have been defiled by the materiall substance (in which they resided) doe passe into the Elements, and from the Elements depart againe into Plants, and living-creatures. And though they do thus mangle the substance of the soul, by their fancies making it in effect both corporeall and subject to perturbations, they say neverthelesse, that it is immortall.
But, in these things they contradict themselves: For, first, they say that the souls which have been defiled, doe returne back to the Elements, and are mingled and tempered one with another; and contrariwise, in the passing of soules from body to body, they say that punishments are inflicted on them according to their offences, joyning and separating again the nature of them, (as occasion serves.)
They hold likewise, that when it is light, shadowes are dispersed; and when all is covered with clouds, that the shadowes are gathered together; which cannot possibly come to passe in an intelligible Nature. For, if a Man should grant that shadowes are dispersed and gathered againe; we must then count shadowes among things subject unto sense.
IIPlato is of opinion that there is both one generall soul, and many particular soules. One soule for the whole world altogether, and other soules for particular things: In such manner, that the whole world is indued with a proper soul of its owne, even with that soul which belongeth unto the whole world; and so also, that particular things are indued with their proper soules, even with the soul, which is peculiar unto every one of them.
The soul (saith hee) which pertaineth to the Vniverse is stretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermost limits of the Heavens, (not as though he conceived such a stretching forth as is inclosed in Place, but such an extension rather as is conceived in our understanding.) And hee saith, that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole Globe, and which holdeth in, and bindeth together all such things as have bodily shape. For (as hath been already declared all corporeall substances have need of somewhat to hold them together; and that is done by the SOUL, which giveth unto every thing the forme.
For, every thing that liveth, hath a proper life of his owne, and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption, (say the Platonists.) So long as it is held, and knit together, they terme it a Bodie; and, when it is dissolved, they say it is corrupted or destroyed.
They affirme, also, that all things live; but, say not that all things are living-creatures. For, they distinguish Plants from things inanimate, for that they increase and are nourished by a nourishing and vegitative power. They distinguish the living-creatures, void of reason, from plants, by sense; And the rationall from the irrationall, by reason.
Thus, though they affirme generally, that all things live; yet they distinguish the nature of every living-thing. Such things as are utterly void of a sensible life, doe live (say they) an habituall life, and are held together by the generall Soul of the World, which keeps them in their proper Being, and undissolved. This, they hold also to be the Soul which governs the world; and, that, it sends into every particular thing such particular Souls, as were before, made for them by the CREATOR. Yea, and they say to, that the Creator gave unto it certaine Lawes, whereby it should order this whole world, (which Lawes they call DESTINIE) and that the same Creator vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for Man: whereof wee shall treat more at large in our discourse of Destinie.
IIIAll the Greek Philosophers who affirme the Soul to be immortall, are of opinion that the SOUL passeth from bodie to bodie: But they differ in setting down of what sort of souls they meane it.
Some understand it of one sort onely; that is to say, of the Reasonable-soul; affirming that it passeth into Plants, and into the bodies of irrationall-creatures: Some of these think this transmigration was but at certaine appointed Revolutions of Time; and some of them imagined the time to be casuall and uncertaine. Some other understand it, not of one sort of souls onely; but of the Irrationall, as well as of the Rationall: and some again, understand it of many sorts of soules, even of so many, as there are divers kinds of living-creatures.
The Schollers of Plato have been somewhat singular in this opinion. For, considering Plato said, that the soules of such as were furious, and angry, and given to rapine, were clothed with the bodies of Wolves and Lions; and that their souls who spent their lives in wantonnesse, tooke upon them the bodies of Asses and such like beasts: Some understand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves & Asses as the bare words doe signifie. Some perceived that he spake figuratively, and by the names of those beasts, understood the conditions or qualities of those creatures. For Cronius in his booke intituled Of the renewed generation (for so he termes the transmigration of SOULS from Bodie to Body) will have it understood of none but reasonable-Soules: Yea and Theodorus (one professing the doctrines of Plato) in his book which affirmeth, that one SOUL comprehends all the species, is likewise of the same minde; And so is Porphyrie.
Sect. 7
I. The singular opinion of Iamblicus, touching the Trāsmigration of Souls. II. Every BODIE hath a SOUL convenient for the same. III. The brute creatures doe nothing according to Reason, but by-naturall instinct IV. The judgement of Galen concerning diversitie of Soules, and a recapitulation of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter, concluding the Soule to be both immortall, and incorporeall.
But, Iamblicus running a contrary race to these men, sayes that wee must understand, that the soul is of the same sort that the living-creature is; and that there be divers kinds of SOULS. He hath affirmed in his booke called MONOBIBLON; that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from Men to unreasonable-creatures, neither from unreasonable-creatures to Men, but from beasts to beasts; and from Men to Men. And in so saying he hath not only well guessed, but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Plato’s opinion: As by many other of his Arguments may be shewed; but, especially by these that follow.
No one of the motions of reason (saith he) manifests it selfe in unreasonable creatures: For, neither Arts, nor Learning, nor Consultations, nor Vertues, nor any other thing belonging to an intelligible nature, can bee found in them. And, therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the reasonable-Soul. Though in Infants, which are very young, there is altogether an unreasonable-motion; yet wee say they have a Reasonable-Soule; because, when they come to yeares, they shew forth the workes of reason. But, in the unreasonable-creature, which, at no age, giveth any token of Reason, the Reasonable-soule would bee superfluous; because, the force of Reason would bee altogether, and at all times, uselesse unto him.
All men have agreed unanimously, that God made no superfluous creature; which being true, it cannot be that a Reasonable-soule should be so superfluously bestowed, as to be placed in cattle, and wilde beasts, which cannot exercise the same; lest it might bee objected as a fault in the Creator, to give an unfit SOUL to the Body: For, it is not the part of a good workeman (or of one who knowes the order and method of working) so to doe.
Now, if any shall object, that there is in beasts, a certaine hidden habit of reason, whereby they are moved; and that their shape makes them uncapable of artificiall workes, as the want of a mans fingers, depriveth him of meanes to practise many Arts, wherein he is experienced, it makes nothing to the matter: For, the same absurdity still remaines; implying that God applyeth SOULS unto some BODIES, which are so unfit, and superfluous, that they are hindered, throughout all the ages, of those creatures, from their operations.
Beside, they confirme their propositions, by things unknowne, and such as are not confessed: For, who allowes this fancy, that, beasts have in them a motion, according to an hidden habit of Reason?
It is therefore better to IIhold, that a SOUL convenient for every Body, is fitly applyed thereunto: That beasts also have nothing more, according to any hidden habit of reason, then doth outwardly appeare in their naturall and simple actions; That every sort of unreasonable-creatures is moved likwise according to a proper instinct of their owne, to such uses, and to such workes as they were ordained unto, from the beginning: and, that the shapes of their Bodies are likewise very fitly accommodated for such purposes
Moreover, the CREATOR, because hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their necessities, hath placed in every one of them such an understanding as is naturall, though not reasonable. In some he hath placed a wilinesse representing Art, and having a shadow of Reason; partly for their better avoiding of snares and dangers, which may betide them, and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another; as hath beene said before.
Now, that the brute-creatures IIIhave not the use of reasō in doing these things is evident in this, that every living-creature of one kinde, doth the same things, and all of them in one, and the same manner. Their practices differ not in multitude, but in this onely, that some use them, perhaps more, and some lesse; for all the whole kinde of them, practise the same wiles.
Every Hare doth use the same subtleties, every Foxe is alike crafty, and every Ape imitates alike. But, it is not so with Man; For, his actions are infinitely various, because, Reason being a certaine thing which is free; and men having also many things in their power, their workings are not one and the same, as it is in every kinde of irrationall creature. For beasts have their motion onely by nature; and such things as are in a creature naturally, are in all of the same kinde. But, the actions proceeding from Reason, are after one sort in one man, after another sort in another, and not necessarily the same in all men.
But, if they should say that mans SOVL is driven into the Bodies of beasts, for a punishment of those faults which i〈•〉 had committed, when it was formerly in man while he lived: This demonstration of theirs (contrary to the rules of Logick) proveth former things, by such as come after: For, why should reasonable SOULS bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man? can you say they had offended in the Body of man before they had entred at all into mans body?
Galen, that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion, & to suppose that in every severall kinde of living-creature there is a sundry kind of soul: For, in the beginning of the first booke of that Tract which he wrote Of the use of the parts; hee sayes thus. Though there be many parts of a living-creature, some greater, some lesse, (and some that cannot be divided into any other kinde) every one of them is usefull some way to the SOUL: For, the Body, is the instrument of the soul, and the parts of living-creatures, differ much from one another, because there is difference in their SOULS.
Againe, somewhat after that in the same book, he addes these words, speaking of an Ape. Oh, thou that art so witty in finding faults I Nature can tell thee that it was convenient a ridiculous shape of Body should be given to that beast whose SOUL was ridiculous. By this it may sufficiently be declared, that Galen thought a diversitie of SOULS was planted in those creatures which were of divers kindes. Thus much of these matters.
Seeing wee have IVnow proved (even by their owne arguments who have held the contrary) that the SOUL is neither a corporeall essence, nor a harmony, nor a Temperature, nor any other quality; it will necessarily follow, that it is a substance incorporeall. All confesse there is a SOUL; and if it be neither a Body, nor an accident, it is mannest that it is a substance without a body; and no such thing as cannot stand by it selfe without a subject: For such things may without the destruction of the subject be either in the same, or absent; but if the SOUL be separated from the body, that body must of necessity be destroyed.
We may use the same reasons to prove the Soul immortall: For, if it bee neither a body, whose nature is subject to dissolution and destruction, as is aforesaid; nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor any thing subject to corruption; then it must needs bee immortall.
There bee many other demonstrations, both in Plato, and others, illustrating the immortality of the SOUL, but they are full of obscurity, and can hardly be understood, or borne away by those who have beene trained up in the same sciences.
To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient, to prove the SOULS immortality; & beare a ful credit in themselves, because they were inspired by God. But, against those who embrace not the Scriptures, as wee Christians doe, wee must prove by demonstration, that the SOUL is no such thing, as is subject to corruption. If it bee no corruptible thing, it must needs bee incorruptible; and consequently immortall. And therefore, to that purpose let this be sufficient.