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On the Nature of Man

Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636

I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which containes the appetite: of concupiscence…

Some hold opinion that irrationality, or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self, as though there were a soule void of reason, which were not a part of the rationall soule: and for these causes they thinke so;

First, for that it is found alone by it selfe in unreasonable living creatures; For thereby it seemes unto them to be perfect of it selfe, and no part of the reasonable soule. Secondly, they so imagine, because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be, to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason.

However, Aristotle affirmes it to be both a part, and a faculty of the reasonable soule, dividing it in to two parts, (as I said before) and calls those two by this one cōmon name, the appetitive-faculty: To which belongs also the motion of our appetite; for appetite is the beginning of motion, as appeares in every living creature having a desire to something; for their desire causes them to move forward, according to their appetite.

This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey, or obey reason: And that part which is obedient unto reason, is divided into two parts, concupiscence, and anger.

The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense, is the Liver. But the instrument of anger is the heart, which being a hard part receives a strong motion, and is ordained for a hard service, and for great resistances; whereas the Liver being a tender entrail, is made the instrument of tender concupiscence.

These things are said to be obedient unto reason, because nature hath ordained them to obey reason, and to bee moved, as reason commandeth, in all such men as live answerable to that which nature (originally) requires. And these are certaine affections, which constitute our Essence, as it hath life in it; For life cannot bee maintained without these.

IIBut whereas this word affection hath divers acceptations, wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath: for either it pertaineth to the body, as when it is sick or ulcerated, in which cases we say it is so or so affected, or else it belongs to the soul, of which we now speake, and wherunto concupiscence and anger doe pertaine. But universally and generally, in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts, it is called an affection, and followeth either, in griefe or pleasure.

For griefe doth follow our affection, but the very passion or affection it selfe, is not griefe: for if that were true, then wheresoever passion were found, there should be griefe also: but things void of life may be patients and suffer, yet feele no griefe. Therefore it is not necessarily consequent, that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing, we should also bee grieved, but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us. Yea, and that which falleth unto us must bee a thing of such moment likewise, as may bee perceived by our sense.

But this is the definition of such affections as are in the soul. An affection is the motion of our power of appetite, subject unto sense, provoked by the appearance of some good or evill. Or else it may bee defined thus: An affection is a motion of the soule, void of reason, supposing either some good or some evill thing.

Affection in generall is by some thus defined; Affection is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another. The operation (or action) is a motion working that which is wrought. And therefore anger is an operation of that part of the soule wherein anger is; but it is an affection of both parts of the soule; and beside that, of all our body, when our body by reason of anger is violently drawn thereby to any furious act: for this motion chanced in one thing, by the commotion of another thing, which was the definition of an affection.

An operation (or action)IIIafter another sort, is called an affection; when it disagreeth from nature; for the operation is a motion according to nature, but the affection is repugnant unto nature: And therefore, an operation when it is not moved according to nature, is called an affection, whether it bee moved of it selfe, or of some other: As for example, the motion which is from the heart in the pulses, is an operation; but that unseasonable motion which commeth by feares or feavers, is an affection or passion. For that great panting proceedeth from the heart it selfe unnaturally; and from thence also commeth naturally the moderate beating of the pulses. Therefore it is no marvaile if one and the same thing bee called both an affection and an operation. For in respect they bee certaine motions proceeding from the passible part of the soule, they be a kinde of operations; but in this respect, that they passe measure, and are not agreeable to nature, they are not operations, but affections.

Thus you see the motion of that part of the soule which is irrationall, to bee an affection in both significations; and that neverthelesse, every motion of the passible part is not called a passion (or affection) but those which are most vehement, or which (at least) proceed so far, that they may bee felt. For, those which are small, and which cannot be felt, are not to be called affections (or passions) while they are in that degree; because there must bee a convenient quantity (or magnitude) to make it a passion.

And for this reason, that clause; whose motion is perceived by sense, is annexed to the definition of an affection; even because small motions, wherunto the sense is not privy, doe not make an affection, as I said before.