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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
15. I. Another division of the soule, being threefold.
Vnto those aforegoing, there is added yet another division of the soule, into the powers, the kindes, and parts thereof; namely, into a vegitative power, which is the same wherby plants (and such like) doe grow; and this is called also a nourishing, or passive power, secondly into a sensible power; and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason.
Zeno the Stoick assignes IIunto the soule eight parts; the reasonable part is the first and principall: the five senses make up sixe, the faculty of speech the seaventh, and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another. But Panetine the philosopher (contradicting this opinion) affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite; and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature, not of the soule, wherein hee hath said very truly.
IIIAristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule into to five parts; namely, that which is vegitative, sensitive, movable in place, that which belongs to appetite, and that which is intellective.
He calls that vegitative, which nourisheth, encreaseth, breedeth, maketh, and formeth bodies; for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing; calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein, and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence.
This is Aristotles opinion in his Physicks; but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule; that is to say, into parts rationall, and irrationall. Of the reasonable-part I have already treated; now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasonable.