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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of such things as are in our power; and wherein our freewill consisteth.
Evidently enough appeares it, that some things are in our power, and that wee have some actions at our dispose. It now remains that we declare, What things they are which bee in our power.
We say in generall, that all things which wee doe voluntarily be in our power; because it could not else be truly verified that the things were done voluntarily, which were not in our power: and because generally all those things whereupon ensueth praise or dispraise; and those also wherein we use exhortation, or law, are in our power; as is afore declared.
But things which are properly in our power; are all such things as belong unto the minde; and those whereof we may consult. For our consulting of them doth imply, that it is in our power to execute that which is proposed and consulted of. And wee have declared in the former part of this treatise, that consultation, and deliberation, fall out in such things onely as are contingent: and that such things only are contingent, which may fall out either this way, or that way, or in a contrary manner.
It is our minde which maketh choice thereof; & it is the beginning of our action; & those are contingent things, which are in our power: To be moved, or not to be moved; To attempt, or not to attempt; To desire things unnecessary, or not desire them; To lie, or speake truth; To give, or not to give; To rejoyce in such things as we ought, or not to rejoyce; and all such other things like unto these, wherein consist the works of vice and vertue: For herein consisteth our freewill.
The Arts also are accounted among such things as may alike fall out, or not fall out: For, every Art brings forth such things as may both be done, and left undone; and such things also, as have the beginning in the doer, and not in the things themselves, which are done: But neither those things which are eternall (and in that respect, things of necessity) neither any other things which are done of necessity, can be said to be done by Art.
Nor is any of those things said to be done by Art, which are contingent, and may bee done otherwise, if they have their efficient cause in themselves; as in living-creatures, and in plants, which are made by nature, not by Art. If therefore the efficient cause of things made by Art, is without themselves; then who is cause of the things made by Art, but the Artificer which made them? And if the making of them belong unto him, then is he the beginning, and cause of his owne actions. And therefore also, the working according, to Art, and vertue, and all actions of mans minde, and of reason, are in mans power: and what actions they are, I have declared already.
IINow the most part of men, supposing that wee are said to have this freewill in every thing which wee doe or possesse, are therefore offended at this opinion; and not without cause. But, some there be, having more acutenesse, who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us (namely, The wayes of man are not in his own hand) say thus unto us.
Good friends, how is the will of man free, seeing his way is not in his owne hands? and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine, that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised?
Many such like things they object, not knowing in what sense, wee speake of freewill. For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich, or poore, or alwayes in health, or of a strong constitution of nature; or to rule; or generally to have those good things, which wee count as instruments to worke things by; or such as are called the gifts of fortune; neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence: But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power, which are according to vice, or vertue; as also, our motions or choice of things; or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary, aswell as the things themselves.
For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action and not onely the deed, but the affection also is condemned; as may plainly appeare in that place of the Gospell, which saith, He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already wth her in his heart. And we read that Iob sacrificed unto God, for such offēces as his children might commit in thought. For indeed the beginning, either of sin, or of doing uprightly is in our will; whereas the doing of the thing it selfe, is otherwhile permitted by Providence, and otherwhile hindered.
For, seeing there are IIIsome things in our power, and a Providence beside; it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both: Because, if they were done by either of them alone, the other should be to no purpose. Therefore in regard all actions are mixt, it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power; another while, that they shall bee as providence alone directeth; and sometimes againe, both according to Providence, and as wee would also.
And whereas likewise there is sometimes a generall, and sometimes a particular Providence; it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things, as it doth in things generall. For if the aire about us bee dry, our bodies are dryed also, though not all alike. And if a mother be given to riotous fare, or a distempered dyet; even thereby shall her children become distempered in body, and perverse in such things as they attempt.
It is plaine therefore, by what hath beene said, that men may fall into a distempered estate of body, either by the generall distēperature of the aire; or by the dyet of parents; or when they spoil themselves by their owne voluptuousnesse; and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves; in such maner, that Providence shall not altogether bee the cause of such things.
If then, the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be overswayed by the temperature of the body, and give place to wrath, or lust; or bee pressed downe by outward things, as poverty; or lifted up, by riches, or the like: if any evill commeth to the same thereby; it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul. Seeing, if shee had not voluntarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures, she might have overcome them, and beene in good case. For through well ordering the affections of the minde, by a convenient dyet, and a good conversation, she might have altered that temperature, rather then have beene perverted thereby.
This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition, and that all such as are not in a good estate, doe sin voluntarily (and not by constraint:) And that it is in our power, either to consent, and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures, or to resist, and overcome them.
Neverthelesse, there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things; and so impute their wickednesse, not unto their owne will, but to necessity. And therefore they cōclude (though very absurdly) that the vertues also, are not in our power.