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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of the pleasures both of minde and body; their variety, and different natures.
Sect. 1
Rightwell may pleasure be divided into corporeall and mentall-pleasures: For, some belong onely to the minde, as to be delighted in knowledge; or in the contemplation of things. Others are called corporeall-pleasures, because they proceed from the conjunction of soul and body, and they are the pleasures which wee have in eating, drinking, carnall-copulation, and the like.
There is no pleasure proper to the body alone: For they that seem to be such, are passions rather then pleasures; as certaine cuttings, and flawings, qualities pertinent to the temperature of the body: For, all pleasure hath sense joyned with it, and (as we have shewed before) all sense belongeth to the soule.
There be divers kindes of pleasure: Some are good, some naught; some false, some true; some pertaine to the minde only; some depend upon knowledge; some belong to the body, and are judged by the sense.
Among pleasures tryed by sense, some be naturall, and some not so. To that pleasure which is in drinking, the griefe which commeth by thirst, is opposed; but to the pleasure which ariseth from contemplation, there is nothing opposite; And by these things it is manifest that the name of pleasure hath many significations.
Among those which we call bodily or corporeall pleasures, some are both necessary and naturall; and without them it is impossible to live; such are the pleasures which we take in eating and drinking what is competent, and in necessary clothing. Some are naturall, but not necessary pleasures, as naturall and legitimate copulation: For though this bee necessary for the preservation of the whole kinde; yet it is not so necessary to the life of any one man, but that he may live in his virginity without it; but some pleasures are neither necessary nor naturall; as drunkennesse, lasciviousnesse, and feeding in excesse.
For these neither assist in propagating the succession of our kinde, as lawfull copulation, neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life; but are (on the contrary) harmefull unto us.
IIHee therefore that would live according to the law of God, must pursue those pleasures onely which are both necessary and naturall. But he that will content himself in the second order of vertues, may take in hand both the forementioned pleasures, and therewith such also as are naturall but not necessary; observing a conveniency in measure, manner, time, and place, the rest hee must by all meanes eschew.
Those pleasures are generally to be accounted good, which are neither intangled with griefe, nor occasion repentance, nor procure other harme, nor depart from the mean, nor draw us from good workes, nor bring us into bondage. But those are properly pleasures, wch are in some sort exercised in the consideration of God, and of knowledge and vertue: And these are to bee placed amōg those pleasures which ought earnestly to be pursued, above all the rest which are profitable unto us; not because they are pertinent unto our being (or for the continuation of our kinde) but for that they constitute our wellbeing, and make us to bee honest, to bee lovers, and beloved of God, and to have the utmost perfection of man; which perfection consisteth in the soule and Vnderstanding.
These pleasures are neither the remedies to avoid diseases, as eating, drinking, and those other which doe supply our wants; neither have they any griefe at all, preceding them, following them, or contrary unto them; but are pure, immixt, and free from every material composition, because they pertaine onely to the soule.
IIIFor according to plato’s opinion of pleasures, there bee some of them false, and some true. Those are false, unto the procuring whereof, sense and a false opinion is needfull; and such also as have grief annexed unto them. True pleasure is that which pertaines to the soule onely, even the soule by it selfe, together with science, understanding, and prudence; and such pleasure as is pure without any mixture of griefe, or subsequent repentance at any time.
Some call such pleasures as ensue upon contemplation, and good actions, not passions, but sweetnesses; and others call them Ioy, as by a proper name.
They define pleasure to be a generation into a nature subject unto sense. But this definition seemeth to agree onely to corporeall pleasure: Seeing by that pleasure, the wants of our body are supplyed and cured, together with such griefes as we sustained by those wants. For when we be cold or thirsty, wee are delighted in the warmth, and in the drinke, whereby that griefe is cured, which proceeded from cold and thirst.
Therefore these pleasures are not good naturally or of themselves, but accidentally: for, as to be in health, is good naturally and by it selfe, whereas to be healed, is but an accidentall good, so these pleasures are onely accidentally good; because they are but remedies for the curing of other things. But the pleasure taken in contemplation is good naturally, and of it selfe; because it is not used in respect of any want.
Hereby it is plain, that all pleasure is not ordained to supply wants; and if this be true, that cannot bee a good definition, which defines pleasure to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense; for it comprehendeth not all pleasure; but leaveth out the best, even the pleasure that is in contemplation.
Sect. 2
I. A definition of pleasure according to Epicurus, and another definition equivolent thereunto. II. A definition of pleasure according to Aristotle. III. Of the sundry sorts of pleasures; of their operations; of such as are proper to man as hee is man; and of such as are common to him, with other living-creatures.
Epicurus the Philosopher defines pleasure to be The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man: and in so defining it he sayes the same thing with him, who affirms it to be A generation into a nature subject unto sense. For hee sayes that our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleasure: But seeing no generation consists of the same proprieties, with those things which proceed thereof, we must not thinke that the generation of pleasure, is pleasure; but, some other thing beside pleasure. For the generation it selfe is conversant about ingendring; but of all things which are begotten, there is nothing which is at once in begetting, and perfectly begotten; seeing it is evident that the acting and the finishing of an act, are distinct things, perfected by degrees. But that which taketh pleasure is delighted all at once; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation.
Furthermore, every generation is a making of things which are not formerly in being; but pleasure cōcerneth such things as have their being already; therefore pleasure cannot be a generation. Again, generation may bee said to be speedy or slow; but so is not pleasure said to be.
Moreover, of good things, some be the habit, some the operation, and some the instruments. The habit, as vertues; the operation, as the action agreeable to vertue. Again, the habit is as the faculty of seeing; the operation, as the seeing it selfe; and the instruments whereby wee worke, as the eye, riches, and such like.
Now all the powers of the soule which are conversant about good or evill things, are the faculties of some habits or other. Therefore, if pleasure bee a good thing, and not an evill thing; these are the onely things in which it can bee conversant. But it cannot bee a habit; neither is it as a vertue; for then it could not be so easily changed into griefe, which is contrary thereunto: neither as it is contrary to privation; seeing it is impossible that a habit, and a privation, should meet in the same subject; as pleasure and griefe may. For there bee some who take pleasure, and are grieved both at once; as they who are gently scratched when they itch; therefore pleasure is not a habit.
Neither is pleasure an instrument; For instruments are ordained in respect of other things, not in respect of themselves, now pleasure is not for any other thing, but for it selfe only, and therefore it cannot be an instrument.
IIPleasure must be therefore an operatiō; & indeed Aristotle defines the same to be an operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature: but by this definition, felicitie should bee pleasure, (seeing felicitie is such an operation as he defineth;) and so his definition is false.
Therefore Aristotle thus correcteth his definition; pleasure (saith hee) is the end of the operations of a living-creature, which are void of incumbrance, and agreeable to nature: So pleasure may bee, as it were, wrapped up, and coexist, together with felicity; but felicity cannot be pleasure.
Now every operation is not a motion; for some operation is practised without motion, such was the operation which God used in the first creation; for the first mover of all things is unmoveable; such also is the operation of contemplation, which man useth; for it is exercised without motion; because the subject of contemplation is alwayes one and the same; and the minde of him that contemplates, alwayes firmly setled upon that object of contemplation.
If then, the pleasure that is in contemplation (and which is the greatest, the principall, and the onely true pleasure) be exercised without motion; it is plaine that such pleasures as have the fewest motions, are by so much the better, and the greater, as their motions are the fewer.
Pleasures, together with IIItheir operations are diversly distinguished; for there be so many pleasures, as of their operations: when the operations are good, the pleasures are good also; and if the operations bee naught, such are the pleasures.
That there bee sundry sorts of pleasure in respect of every sense, it is very manifest; for there be many pleasures both in touching and tasting; and great diversitie also in the pleasures of the sight, of the hearing, and of the smell: and the purer senses are they which keepe the farthest distance from their objects, which delight them, as the slight, the hearing, and the smell.
There bee two sorts of the operations of the minde, the one in practise, the other in contemplation; and therefore it is evident, that there are two sorts of pleasure which follow these operations; and that those which follow the contemplation are more pure, then those which follow the practise.
The pleasures of the minde (or understanding) are proper to man as hee is man; but they which pertaine to the sense, are common to him with other living-creatures, in respect of his being a living-creature.
Now seeing it is thus, and that some are delighted with such pleasures, as pertaine to sense, and others with some other pleasures; those pleasures onely are to be accounted good of their owne nature, which are judged good, not of evill men, but of good men: For in doubtfull matters, every common fellow is not a competent judge; but he that is both skilfull, and regulateth himselfe according to the rule of (undepraved) nature.