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On the Nature of Man
Nemesius of Emesa, tr. Wither, 1636
I. Of the memorative part of the Soul, and the definition of memory according to Origen…
The seat of memory, which the Greekes cal Mnemoneuticon, is the cause and storehouse both of memorie and recordation, or remembrance.
Memory (as Origen saith) is a certaine appearance left in the minde, by some sense which had wrought actually before. Plato taketh it to be a preservation of things both felt and considered: For, the minde takes hold of things which are subject unto sense, by the seats of the sense, and therof is opinion begotten. But, it layeth hold on things intelligible by understanding; and thence ariseth consideration. And when the minde retaines the Prints both of things in opinion, and of those also which are in consideration, we then say, that it remembers them.
IIIt is likely that Plato doth herein meane, by the name of consideration, not the principall consideration; but a certaine cogitation: For things contained in sense, are remembred by themselves; but, things contained in understanding, are accidentally remembred. The remembrance of things thought upon by us, doth remaine in us upon the heed of some appearance which was before in our imagination: And we remember those things which are properly contained in our understanding, in respect that wee have learned them, and heard them; but as for their substance, wee have no memory thereof.
For indeed, the apprehending of things contained in understanding, proceeds not from any preceding imagination; but commeth to us by learning, and by a naturall notion.
If we be said to remember such things as we saw, or heard, or knew heretofore, by some occasion or meanes: This word heretofore (having relation to the time past) makes it plaine, that such things as are made and destroyed againe, and such as have their being in time, are comprehended in memory; and that our memory consisteth of things absent, but is not procured (or moved) by those absent things.
Recordation (or remembrance) called by the Greekes Anamnesis; is when forgetfulnesse hath interrupted our memory; for it is a recovering of memory, which was lost, when it failed by forgetfulnesse.
Memory is lost, either altogether (and for ever) or else, for a space onely; and when it faileth but for a space, we call the recovery thereof remembrance.
But there is another kind of recordation, which is not occasioned by the forgetfulness of such things as proceed from sense or understanding; but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by naturall notions. By naturall notions (or things naturally conceived) I meane such as every man hath in him without any teacher; as that there is a God. This Plato calleth a recordation of Idea’s; and what is meant by Idea’s I will hereafter shew.
Such things as appeare unto the imagining part, are from thence conveyed unto the cogitation; and the cogitation, or discoursing part (when it hath once apprehended such things & judged of them) sends them to bee stored up in that part of the soule, wherein memory is resident.
IIIThe instruments used by the memory, are the hinder braine-pan, called by the Greekes 〈…〉, and 〈…〉, and the vitall spirit there placed.
But seeing we have affirmed, that the beginnings and roots of the senses, are the former pans of the braine; The seat of the cogitation, the middle pan; And of the memory, the hinder-pan; it will be necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so. Lest we seeme to give credit to that which hath been spoken, without any reason to be rendred for the same.
A plaine demonstration thereof may bee taken from the parts themselves; for, if by any meanes the former braine-pan be hurt, the senses are much hindred; but the cogitation remaineth sound. If only the middle-pan be harmed, the cogitation is maymed; but the seat of sense keepes the senses whole. If any hurt befall both to the former and middle-pan, both sense and cogitation decay. If the hinder-pan be onely disordered, the memory alone perisheth, and neither sense nor cogitation receive harme. But if the former, the middle, and the hinder braine-pans be all together out of order, the party so disturbed is maimed, in sense, in cogitation, and memory, all at once; and the whole living-creature is in danger of destruction.
This is made evident also by many diseases, and accidents which are symptomes of diseases, and especially in frantick men. For in some of them their cogitation onely is hurt, and their senses are preserved whole.
Such a frantick man, is mentioned by Galen, who being in a place wherein a wool-winder was at work by him, rose up, and taking certaine glasse vessels which hee found in the roome, ran to the window, and asked such as passed by, whether they would have such or such glasses cast downe unto them, calling every vessell by the right name: And when they who stood below said they would have it so, hee threw them all downe, one after another.
Then hee asked them whether they would have the wool-winder throwne downe also; they (thinking he had but jested) replyed yea: whereupon he tooke up the wool-winder and hurled him headlong from a high place.
This man had his senses whole enough; for hee knew which were the glasse-vessels, and which was the wool-winder; but his cogitation was diseased.
Others there be, who deluded by a vaine imagination, suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene; whereas in other things, they are not without the direction of reason. In such as these, the former braine-pans are only diseased, and the middle-pan uncrased; For, by those diseases which follow every part, the course of their operation is accordingly hindred; and the living-creature is hurt in respect of that operation, to the working wherof the part diseased is naturally serviceable. As for example, if the feet bee hurt, our walking is hindered; for that is the work whereunto the foot serveth.