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Four Hundred Chapters on Love
St Maximus the Confessor, tr. Sherwood, 1955
3. The Third Century
The reasonable use of thoughts and things is productive of temperance, charity, and knowledge; the unreasonable use, of intemperance, hate, and ignorance.
Thou hast prepared a table before me, etc.1 Table here signifies the virtue of the active life. This is prepared by Christ against them that afflict us. The oil anointing the mind signifies contemplation of creatures; the chalice of God, the very knowledge of God; His mercy, His Word and God. For He through His Incarnation follows us all days until He apprehend all that are to be saved, as He did in the case of Paul. The house signifies the kingdom wherein all the saints will be settled; the length of days, eternal life.
It is with misuse of the soul’s powers that the vices come upon us—the vices of the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational element. Misuse of the rational power is found in ignorance and folly; of the irascible and concupiscible, in hate and intemperance. Their proper use is in knowledge and prudence, in charity and temperance. If this is so, nothing created by God is evil.2
Food is not evil, but gluttony; nor is the begetting of children, but fornication; nor money, but avarice; nor glory, but vainglory. If this is so, nothing among creatures is evil except misuse which comes from the mind neglecting to cultivate itself as nature demands.
The blessed Denis3 says that among the demons evil manifests itself as unreasonable anger, senseless concupiscence, rash imagination. But unreasonableness, senselessness, and rashness with rational creatures show themselves as privations of reason, sense, and circumspection. Privations, however, follow upon habits. The demons therefore once had prudent reason, sense, and circumspection. If this is so, neither are the demons evil by nature; but have become evil by misuse of their natural powers.
Some passions are productive of licentiousness, some of hate; some are productive of both licentiousness and hate.
Excessive and delicate eating are the cause of licentiousness; avarice and vainglory, of hate for one’s neighbor. Their mother, self-love, is cause of both together.
Self-love is the impassioned, unreasonable affection for one’s body; to it is opposed charity and self-mastery. To have self-love is clearly to have all the passions.
No man, says the Apostle, ever hated his own flesh, but of course mortifies it and makes it his slave.4 He grants it nothing but food and clothing, and these only as they are necessary for life. Thus then a man loves it without passion and nourishes it as a servant of divine things and comforts it with those things only that supply its need.
When a man loves someone, he certainly is eager to do him service. If then one loves God, he certainly is eager to do the things that please Him. But if he loves his flesh, his eagerness is to perform what delights it.
Charity, temperance, contemplation, and prayer please God; gluttony, licentiousness, and what multiplies them, the flesh. Therefore they who are in the flesh cannot please God. And they that are Christ’s have crucified their flesh with the passions and concupiscences.5
The mind, when it tends towards God, takes the body for servant and grants it nothing more than the necessities of life; but when it tends to the flesh, it makes itself servant of the passions and always makes provision for its concupiscences.6
If you will to be master of your thoughts, attend to your passions and you will easily drive them out of your mind away from your thoughts. Thus for fornication, fast, keep vigil, labor, keep to yourself. For anger and grief, scorn repute and dishonor and material things. For grudges, pray for him that offends and you will be set free.
Do not measure yourself by the standard of weaker men, but strive rather to apply yourself to the commandment of love. In measuring yourself by the former you fall into the pit of presumption, in striving for the latter you advance to the heights of humility.
If you really keep the commandment of love for neighbor, what makes you conceive for him bitterness and grief? Is it not clearly because in your preference and contention for transitory things instead of the commandment, you make war on your brother?
Not so much from necessity has gold become the object of zealous pursuit among men, as that with it most of them serve their pleasures.
There are three reasons for love of money—love of pleasure, vainglory, and lack of faith and confidence. Lack of faith is worse than the other two.
The hedonist loves money because with it he lives sumptuously; the vain man, because it makes him well-known; the fainthearted, that he may hide and guard it for fear of famine, old age, sickness, or exile. He puts his trust in it rather than in God the maker of all creation, who provides even for the last and least of living things.
There are four kinds of money getters—the three just mentioned and managers of finances. These latter, of course, alone get it in the right fashion: their purpose is that they may never run short in their distribution to each in his need.7
All impassioned thoughts either excite the concupiscible, or stir up the irascible, or darken the rational element of the soul. Hence it comes about that the mind is hampered in its spiritual contemplation and in the flights of its prayer. For this reason the monk, and especially the solitary, should accurately attend to his thoughts and both know and excise their causes. He should know this, for example: impassioned memories of women excite the soul’s concupiscible element; their cause is want of self-control in eating and drinking and frequent, unreasonable association with these same women; hunger, thirst, vigils, and solitude cut them off. Again, impassioned memories of offenders stir the temper; their cause is love of pleasure, vainglory, and attachment to material things. For such reasons the man of passions is grieved, inasmuch as he has either lost or not attained them. These are cut off by scorn and contempt, out of love for God.8
God knows Himself, He knows too the things He has made. The holy Powers also know God, they also know the things He has made. But not as God knows Himself and the things He has made do the holy Powers know God and the things made by Him.9
God knows Himself from His own blessed essence, and the things He has made from His Wisdom10 through which and in which He made all things. The holy Powers know God by participation, Him who is beyond participation, and things made by Him by the perception of what may be contemplated in them.
Created things are outside the mind; within, it receives the contemplation of them. Not so with God, the eternal, infinite, immense, who freely bestows being, well-being, and ever-being on His creatures.11
Natures endowed with reason and understanding participate in the holy God by their very being, by their aptness for well-being (that is, for goodness and wisdom) and by the free gift of ever-being. In this way then they know God. Things made by Him they know, as we have said, by perceiving the ordered wisdom to be seen in creatures. This wisdom is simply in the mind without substance of its own.12
In bringing into being natures endowed with reason and understanding, God, out of His supreme goodness, communicated to them four of the divine attributes by which He supports, guards, and preserves beings, namely: being and ever-being, goodness and wisdom. Of these, the first two He grants to the essence; the other two, goodness and wisdom, He grants for fitness of will and judgment, in order that the creature may become by sharing, what He is by essence. Therefore he is said to be made to God’s image and likeness; to the image of His being by being, of His ever-being by ever-being (though it has a beginning, yet it is without end); to the likeness of His goodness by goodness, of His wisdom by wisdom. The one is by nature, the other by grace. Every rational nature is made to the image of God, but only the good and wise to His likeness.13
All nature endowed with reason and understanding is divided into two kinds, angelic and human nature. All angelic nature is again divided into two universal sides or groups, holy or accursed—into holy Powers and impure demons. All human nature is divided into two universal sides only, the pious and the impious.14
God, as self-existence and as being Himself goodness and wisdom (to speak more truly, He is above all such things), has absolutely no contrary quality. Creatures, inasmuch as all have their existence, and rational, intelligent ones their aptitude for goodness and wisdom, by participation and grace, do have contrary qualities. As contrary to existence they have not to exist, as contrary to their aptitude for goodness and wisdom they have vice and ignorance. That they exist forever or do not exist, this is in the power of the Maker; to share in His goodness and wisdom or not to share, this depends on the will and purpose of rational beings.
When the Greeks maintain that the substance of everything eternally coexisted with God and that they have only their qualities from Him, they assert that substance has no contrary, but that contrariety is found only in the qualities. We affirm that the divine substance alone has nothing contrary, since it is eternal and infinite and bestows eternity on all the rest. The substance of things, however, has not-being as contrary. It depends on the power of Him who in the true sense is whether the substance of things should ever be or not be; and His gifts are without repentance. Therefore it both ever is and will be sustained by His all-powerful might, even though, as was said, it has non-being as contrary, for it was produced from non-being into being, and whether it is or is not depends on His will.15
As evil is the privation of the good, and ignorance of knowledge; so not-being is privation of being, not of true Being (for it has no contrary), but of participated true Being. The former privations follow the will and judgment of creatures; the latter rests with the will of the Maker. And He of His goodness ever wills beings to be and always to receive His benefits.16
Of all creatures, some are rational and intelligent; they admit contraries: virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. Others are bodies, variously made up of contraries, that is, of earth, air, fire, water. Then there are others entirely bodiless and immaterial, though some of these are joined to bodies. Some, too, have their make-up only of matter and form.
All bodies by nature lack power of motion. They are moved by the soul—some by a rational, some by an irrational, some by an insensitive soul.
The soul has powers for nourishment and growth, for imagination and appetite, for reasoning and understanding. Plants share in the first only; irrational animals also in the second; men in the third in addition to the first two. The first two powers are perishable; the third is imperishable and immortal.17
In sharing with one another their illumination the holy Powers share also with humankind either their virtue or their knowledge. Thus, by their virtue—an imitation of the divine goodness—they benefit themselves, one another, and their inferiors, rendering them Godlike. As to their knowledge: this is either something more exalted about God (Thou, O Lord, art most high for evermore, says the Scripture18), or more profound about bodies, or more accurate about incorporeal beings, or more distinct about providence, or more manifest about judgment.
The mind is impure, first, in having false knowledge, then in not knowing some one of the universals (I speak of the human mind, for angelic knowledge comprehends also the singular), thirdly in having impassioned thoughts, fourthly in consenting to sin.
In not acting according to nature is the soul impure. Hence impassioned thoughts are begotten in the mind. For then does the mind act according to nature, when its sensitive powers (I refer to anger and concupiscence) remain detached under the impact of things and the representations that come with them.
In sin of deed is the body impure.19
He that is not drawn to worldly things loves solitude. He that loves nothing human loves all men.20 He has knowledge of God and of divine things who takes offense at no one, moved neither by faults nor suspicions.
It is a great thing to suffer no attachment for things; it is greater far to remain detached as regards their representations.
Charity and self-mastery keep the mind detached as regards things and their representations.
The God-loving mind does not war against things nor against their representations, but against the passions joined with these representations. Thus he does not war against the woman, nor against him who offends him, nor against their images, but against the passions that are joined with the images.
The monk’s whole war is against the demons, that he may separate the passions from the representations. Otherwise he will not be able to look on things with detachment.21
Thing, representation, passion—all differ. A thing is, for instance, a man, woman, gold, and so on; a representation is a mere recollection of one of these things; passion is unreasonable affection or senseless hate for one of the foregoing. A monk’s battle is then against passion.
An impassioned representation is a thought compounded of passion and representation. Let us separate the passion from the representation: the thought alone will remain. If we but will, we make this separation by means of spiritual charity and self-mastery.
The virtues separate the mind from the passions; spiritual contemplations from simple representations; pure prayer then places it before God Himself.22
The virtues are ordered to the knowledge of creatures; this knowledge to the knower; the knower to Him who is known in ignorance and knows beyond all knowledge.23
Not as though in need of something did God, who is plenitude beyond measure, bring into being His creatures, but that they might proportionately share in Him with delight and that He Himself might enjoy His works, seeing them rejoice and ever insatiably sated on Himself the inexhaustible.
The world has many poor in spirit, but not as they should be; many that mourn, but for bad bargains or for loss of children; many meek, but in the face of impure passions; many hungering and thirsting, but to seize others’ goods and to gain unjustly. And there are many merciful, but to the body and its comforts; many clean of heart, but for vanity’s sake; many peacemakers, but they subject the soul to the flesh. The world has many that suffer persecution, but undisciplined; many that are reviled, but for shameful sins. Only those are blessed who do and suffer all these things for Christ and after His example. Why? Because theirs is the kingdom of heaven, and they shall see God, and what follows. So then, not because they do and suffer such things are they blessed (for the men just mentioned do the same), but because they do and suffer them for Christ and after His example.24
In everything we do God looks to the intention, as has often been said, whether we are acting for Him or for some other reason. When then we want to do something good, let us have, not human considerations, but God as our goal, that always looking to Him we may do all for Him; otherwise we shall undergo the toil and yet lose our reward.
In time of prayer cast away from the mind the empty representations of human affairs and contemplations of all creatures, lest in imagining lesser things you be deprived of Him who incomparably exceeds all beings.
If we genuinely love God, we cast out the passions by this very love. This is charity towards Him—to prefer Him to the world, the soul to the flesh, while scorning worldly matters to devote oneself to Him continually by means of self-mastery, charity, prayer, psalmody, and so on.
If we devote ourselves for a long time to God and keep watch over the sensitive part of our soul, we no longer run into the attacks of thoughts; rather, as we look more accurately into and cut off their causes, we become more clear-sighted, so that the words are fulfilled in us: My eye also hath looked down upon my enemies: and my ear shall hear the malignant that rise up against me.25
When you see that your mind is frequenting the representations of the world with justice and piety, know then that your body also remains pure and sinless. But when you see that your mind is giving itself to sins in thought and you do not check it, know then that your body too will not be long in falling into those sins.
As the body has things for its world, so the mind has representations for its world. And as the body commits fornication with a woman’s body, so the mind with representation of the woman and the picturing of its own body. For the mind’s eye sees the semblance of its own body joined with that of the woman. So also the mind beats off the semblance of its offender, through the semblance of its own body. And similarly for other sins. For what the body does in deed in the world of things, that the mind does too in the world of representations.
There is no reason to be horrified, stupefied, astounded because God the Father judges no one and has given all judgment to the Son. The Son cries out: Judge not that you may not be judged; condemn not that you may not be condemned.26 Similarly the Apostle: Judge not before the time, until the Lord come. And: With what judgment thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself.27 But men, in forgoing to weep for their sins, take judgment away from the Son and do themselves, as though sinless, judge and condemn each other. At this heaven is astounded,28 earth is horrified, but they, in their insensitiveness, are not ashamed.
The man that busies himself with other people’s sins or even judges his brother on a suspicion, has not yet laid the foundations of penitence nor begun to seek knowledge of his own sins (which are in fact heavier than many pounds of lead); nor does he know why it is that the man loving vanity and seeking after lies becomes heavyhearted.29 Therefore as a senseless man going about in the dark, he lets his own sins go and pictures those of others, whether they do exist or he only suspects them.
Self-love, as we have often said, is the cause of all the impassioned thoughts. By it are begotten the three capital thoughts of concupiscence—gluttony, avarice, and vainglory. By gluttony fornication of thought is begotten; by avarice, rapacity of thought; by vainglory, pride of thought. All the rest follow one or the other of these three —the thoughts of anger, grief, grudges, sloth, envy, detraction and the rest. These passions then bind the mind to material things and hold it down on earth, lying upon it like a massive stone, whereas by nature it is lighter and more agile than fire.
The origin of all the passions is self-love, their end, pride. Self-love is unreasonable affection for the body. Who cuts this out, cuts out at the same time all the passions that come from it.
As parents bear affection to the offspring of their bodies, so also the mind is naturally attached to its own reasonings. And as to impassioned parents, their children, though they be complete objects of ridicule, appear as the handsomest and most gentle-bred of all; so with the man of no sense, his reasonings, though they be utterly wretched, appear to him as quite the most sensible. The wise man thinks differently of the products of his reasoning. When it seems certain that his products are true and worthwhile, then especially does he distrust his own judgment and makes others, wise men, the judges of his own writings and thoughts (lest he should run or have run in vain30) and from these he receives assurance.
When you overcome some one of the dishonorable passions, as gluttony, fornication, anger, or rapacity, then at once the thought of vainglory lights upon you. When you overcome this, pride follows after.
All the dishonorable passions that lay hold of the soul drive the thought of vainglory from it; when these are bested, they let it go free.31
Vainglory, whether removed or remaining, begets pride; removed it produces presumption; remaining, boastfulness.
Secret exercise32 removes vainglory; ascribing our right actions to God removes pride.
He that merits knowledge of God and really enjoys the consequent pleasure, scorns all pleasures begotten by the concupiscible element.33
He that desires earthly things desires either food or things that serve the baser passions or a reputation or money or some other thing that goes with them. Unless the mind should discover something better to which to transfer its desire, it would never be persuaded to scorn them. Now knowledge of God and divine things is incomparably their better.34
Those that scorn pleasures do so either from fear or from hope or from knowledge or also from love of God.
The passionless knowledge of divine things does not convince the mind altogether to scorn material things; it is like the mere thought of a sensible thing. Hence many men may be found with much knowledge who yet wallow in fleshly passions like swine in the mire.35 These men, purified for a little by their care and attaining knowledge but later grown careless, are to be likened to Saul. Saul merited the kingship, but conducting himself unworthily, he was cast out of it with fear-inspiring wrath.
As the simple thought of human things does not force the mind to scorn the divine, so neither does the simple knowledge of divine things persuade it to scorn completely human things; because the truth now exists in shadows and figures. Therefore there is need for the blessed passion of holy charity; it binds the mind to spiritual objects and persuades it to prefer the immaterial to the material, the intelligible and divine to the sensible.
Not everyone that cuts back his passions and makes his thoughts simple thereby turns them to divine things. He can on the contrary be drawn neither to human things nor to the divine. This happens in the case of men of the active life who have not yet merited knowledge; they put off the passions either by fear of punishment or hope of the kingdom.
We walk by faith, not by sight;36 our knowledge is by mirrors, in riddles. Therefore we need to spend much time with them that by length of meditation and discussion we may acquire a well-settled habit of vision.
If we cut off the causes of passions a little and are engrossed in spiritual contemplations, but do not always abide in them with constant effort, we easily turn again to the fleshly passions and gather no other fruit than bare knowledge with presumption. The result is the gradual obscuring of this knowledge itself and the complete turning of the mind to material things.
The blameworthy passion of love engrosses the mind in material things; the laudable passion of love binds it even to divine things. For usually where the mind has leisure there it expands; where it expands there it directs its desire and love, whether this be in divine and intelligible things (which are properly its own), or in the things of the flesh and the passions.
God established the invisible world and the one that we see; the soul, of course, and the body He made. Now if the visible world is so beautiful, of what sort then will the invisible be? And if this latter is better, how much more so God who founded them both? If then the artificer of all that is beautiful is better than all creatures, what reason has the mind for leaving what is best of all to be engrossed in the worst of all? I mean the passions of the flesh. Or is it not plain that the mind has not yet a perfect experience of Him that is best of all, the Transcendent, since from birth it associates with and is accustomed to the flesh? If therefore by prolonged practice of self-mastery over pleasure and exercise in the meditation of divine things we little by little break it away from this relation, it then expands, advancing gradually in divine things, and comes to know its own dignity and, finally, to put all its yearning on God.
He who speaks of his brother’s sin with detachment does so for two reasons, either to correct him or to help another. Otherwise if he speaks, to the brother or someone else, it is with reviling and ridicule. He will not escape being deserted by God, but will fall into the same or another transgression; he will be rebuked and reviled by others, he will be shamed.
Sinners have not all the same reason for committing the same sin in act, but several. For instance, it is one thing to sin out of habit, it is another to sin, caught unawares. Here he fully reflected neither before nor after the sin, rather he was even greatly grieved over the incident; there, quite on the contrary, the habitual sinner never ceased sinning mentally and after the deed he has the same intention.
The man that goes after the virtues out of vanity obviously goes after knowledge too out of vanity. Such a one clearly neither does nor says anything for edification, but always in eager pursuit of the approval of the onlookers or hearers. This passion of his is discovered when some among these lay censure on his doings or his words and he is vastly grieved, not because he failed to edify them (that was not his purpose), but because he was himself brought to contempt.
The passion of avarice is discovered when a man receives with joy but gives away with sorrow. Such a one cannot fill the steward’s office.37
For these reasons a man endures sufferings: for the love of God, for the hope of reward, for the fear of punishment, for fear of men, because of his nature, because of pleasure, because of gain, because of vainglory, for necessity.
It is one thing to be released from thoughts, another to be freed from passions. Often indeed a man is released from thoughts of things to which he is attached when they are not present, yet the passions are hidden in the soul and are discovered when the things appear. In the presence of things therefore one must watch over the mind and know for which of them it holds attachment.
He is a genuine friend who in the times of his neighbor’s trial bears quietly and without fuss his incidental tribulations, anguish, and misfortunes, as though they were his own.38
Do not disregard your conscience, which always counsels you of the best. It puts before you divine and angelic advice; it frees you from the hidden stains of your heart, and will make you the gift of free speech39 with God at the time of your departure.40
If you want to become an arbiter, moderate, and no servant of the passion of presumption, seek always in things that which is hidden from your knowledge. You will find a great diversity of things that escape your notice; you will marvel at your lack of knowledge and be reduced in your own estimation. And when you come to know yourself,41 you will understand many great and wonderful things; since in fact to think one knows does not permit one to advance in knowledge.
He surely wants to be healed who makes no resistance to the healing drugs. These are the pains and griefs which diverse circumstances bring on. The man who resists does not know what is going on here nor what he would gain from it when he leaves this world.
Vainglory and avarice are parents one of the other. Vain men get rich; rich men grow vain, that is, as world-lings. The monk, since he is without possessions, grows all the vainer. And when he does have money, he hides it in shame as something unbecoming his habit.
This is proper of the monk’s vainglory, that he grows vain over virtue and all that goes with it; of his pride this is proper, that he be elated over his good deeds, contemn others, and ascribe these deeds to himself and not to God. Of the worldling’s vainglory and pride this is proper, that he be vain and elated over good looks, wealth, influence, and prudence.42
Accomplishments for seculars are faults for monks; accomplishments for monks are faults for seculars. For instance, accomplishments for seculars are wealth, reputation, influence, fastidiousness, bodily comfort, numerous children, and the things that go with all these. And should a monk come to these, he is lost. The monk’s accomplishments are to possess nothing, to have no reputation, to have no influence, self-mastery, suffering of evil, and all that goes with these. And should a worldling come to these against his will, he reckons it a great fault and often is in danger of hanging himself; some, in fact, have done so.
Foods were created for two reasons: for nourishment and for healing. Those taking food for other reasons, since they misuse what God has given for use, are condemned as voluptuaries. With everything, misuse is sin.
Humility is continual prayer with tears and hardships. This constant calling upon God for help does not permit us senselessly to grow bold in our own power and wisdom nor to put ourselves before others. These are the serious diseases of the passion of pride.
It is one thing to fight mere thoughts that the passions be not roused; it is another to fight impassioned thoughts that consent may not be given. Neither way, however, permits thoughts to linger.
Grief and grudges go together. When at the sight of a brother a man’s mind mirrors grief, it is clear that he bears him a grudge. But the ways of the resentful lead to death, because every resentful man transgresses the law.43
If you bear someone a grudge, pray for him and you stop the rising passion: by prayer you are separating the grief from the memory of the evil which he did you; and so, becoming charitable and kind, you entirely wipe out the passion from your soul. Conversely, if another bears you a grudge, be gracious with him and humble, deal fair with him, and you deliver him from the passion.
You will allay the grief of the envious man with great difficulty, since he reckons what he envies in you as his misfortune; it can be allayed in no other way than by your hiding something from him. But if this thing is beneficial to many, yet to him a cause of grief, which side will you take? It is then necessary to stay with the benefit of the many and still, as much as you may, not neglect him. Nor will you be carried away by the virulence of the passion (as you are not assisting the passion but the sufferer); but in humility you will esteem him more than yourself; always, everywhere, and in every situation you will prefer him. For your own envy, you will be able to allay it, if you rejoice with the man you envy at what he rejoices, and grieve at what he grieves. Thus you fulfil the saying of the Apostle: Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep.44
Our mind stands midway between two things, each of which is active in its own way, the one working virtue, the other vice—in other words, between angel and demon. The mind has power and authority to follow or resist which one it wills.
The holy Powers exhort us to the good; natural tendencies and good choice help us. Passions and evil choice support the attacks of the demons.45
Sometimes God Himself enters the pure mind and teaches it; sometimes the holy Powers suggest good things; sometimes the nature of the things we contemplate.
The mind that has merited knowledge must keep its representations of things detached, its contemplations secure, its state of prayer untroubled. Still it cannot always preserve them from the surgings of the flesh, since it is befogged by the plotting of demons.
The same things do not grieve and anger us; for things that make us grieve abound apart from anger. For instance, one thing is broken, another is lost, so and so dies—for the like of these we grieve only; for the rest, in our unphilosophical46 disposition, we are both grieved and angered.
The mind, in receiving the representations of things, is naturally patterned after each representation; in contemplating them spiritually, it is diversely conformed to each object of contemplation. When it comes to be in God,47 it is entirely without form and without pattern. For in contemplating Him who is simple, it becomes simple and wholly transfused with light.48
That soul is perfect whose sensitive powers tend wholly towards God.
That mind is perfect which, through true faith, in supreme ignorance supremely knows the supremely Unknowable; and which, in gazing upon the universe of His handiwork, has received from God comprehensive knowledge of His providence and judgment—but I speak after the manner of men.49
Time is divided in three; faith correspondingly extends to all three parts; hope to one; charity to the remaining two. Faith and hope remain to a certain point, charity for infinite ages in super-union with the super-infinite, ever increasing more. Therefore, the greatest of all is charity.50
Notes
- Ibid. 22.5 f.: Thou hast prepared a table before me against them that afflict me. Thou hast anointed my head with oil; and my chalice which enebriateth me, how goodly is it! And Thy mercy will follow me all the days of my life. And that I may dwell in the house of the Lord unto length of days.—Here Maximus presents a threefold division: active life, natural contemplation, knowledge of God, to which is added the Word. Cf. Char 4.47. The reference to St. Paul is verified in Phil. 3.12.
- See Char 2.75 n. 127.
- De div. nom. 4.23 (MG 3.724 f.).
- Eph. 5.29 conflated with 1 Cor. 9.27.
- Rom. 8.8 conflated with Gal. 5.24.
- Cf. Rom. 13.14.
- The ground of such a doctrine of stewardship is found in the New Testament, Matt. 22.45; 25.4 ff.; Acts 4.35; Eph. 4.22. Maximus does not attend to the means of earning money but to the intention, the σκοπός. See Char 2.36 n. 111.
- On the ‘flights’ (more properly ‘departure’) of prayer see Char 1.10 n. 6. The causes of thoughts are here elaborated on a plan indicated above, Char 1.7. For ‘solitary’ cf. Char 2.19 n. 94.
- The chapters 21–33 form a distinct group, that serves to place the spiritual doctrine of the Centuries against the fuller background of God and the relations of creatures to Him. (Is it mere chance that there are 13 chapters? Epifanovitch 64 f. [from the MS Vat. gr. 507 f. 127v-128] prints ‘13 chapters on the wills, that is, against those who speak of one will of Our Lord and God and Savior Jesus Christ’; cf. also the group Char 4.1–13). The first chapters (21–24) dealing with God’s knowledge of Himself and by His creatures, clearly distinguish God from His creatures. The 25th establishes a basis for distinguishing image and likeness, the one depending on the metaphysical structure of the creature, the other on his free activity. There follows (26) the division of rational creatures into angels and men; and each of these into the good and the wicked. Chs. 27 and 28 return to the distinction of God and creatures, but now on the ontological basis of there being for God no contrary whatsoever, while in creatures there is always the possibility that the opposite be realized. This possible privation of good explains ignorance and evil (29,30). The inanimate and merely animate creation are then brought into the synthesis (31,32). In 33 there is the binding together of creation by the higher angels who share their greater knowledge and virtue with the lesser and with men. See Pegon’s note to this group.
- Wisdom here refers to the Word of God. This is indicated by the following ‘through which and in which’ (cf. Rom. 11.36 and Col. 1.16), and confirmed by the conclusion of 24 affirming that the wisdom in things is not substantial (hypostatic).
- The series of three, ‘eternal, infinite, immense,’ occurs in Char 1.100, where goodness and wisdom (found here in the next chapter) are joined to them. The other triplet, ‘being, well-being, ever-being,’ is one not always interpreted identically. The uncertainty is due to the tacit assumption that eternal being is the same as eternal well-being. This is excluded just below, in 25, and also in 4.13. In Amb 42 (1325B f. and 1348D) eternal being is joined with the resurrection. In Amb 7 (1073C) the end of creaturely motion (in the full sense) is said to be everlasting well-being. In Amb 10 (1116B) it is stated that it is only the well-being, dependent on our own efforts, which permits either the being or the everlasting being to be strictly predicated. In Thal 64 (728A) everlasting well-being is attributed to the law of grace. Though the word ‘image’ there occurs, Maximus does not think to contrast it with ‘likeness.’
- ‘Aptness’ (ἐπιτηδειότης): the concept is explained in the dispute with Pyrrhus (TP 28–313A f.); it cannot be ascribed to Christ (cf. 27). He therefore always had eternal well-being, or well-being in full act. The gnomic character of this term is underlined in the following chapter, ‘fitness of will and judgment’ (γνωμικὴ ἐπιτηδειότης). ‘Goodness’ and ‘wisdom’: cf. Char 1.100 and the Introd. on the traces of the Trinity, 40. The final qualification of wisdom as seen in creation as non-substantial is doubtless in contradistinction to the hypostatic Wisdom of 22.
- On ‘likeness’ (ὁμοίωσις) see the references given for ‘image’ (εἰκών) in the Introd. n. 425.
- Of these two sets of distinctions one is clearly ontological, the other moral. It was the lack of this distinction that permitted Origen to divide spiritual beings ontologically by the degree of their moral purity. Cf. Introd. 39.
- For this and chapter 30, Viller (258), whom Pegon follows, cites Evagrius, Centuries 1.1,2,4 (Frankenberg 49,51). Between Char 3.30 and Evagrius 1.4 there is great similarity, yet Maximus’ fulness of treatment is not due to Evagrius, who merely states: ‘everything that comes to be is either receptive of contraries or made up of contraries.’ In ch. 28 it is rather the pagan doctrine that is rejected. Evagrius does not at all say that created substances have a contrary, namely, not to be.—For the Scriptural allusion see Rom. 11.29.
- This chapter is a strict consequent of the preceding. The contrary of substance, not-being, is explained by the better known ideas of evil and ignorance as privations of good and of knowledge (cf. Thal prol.–253AB). See also Char 2.15,17; 4.14.
- ‘Imperishable and immortal’: this constitutes the image and pertains to the λόγος; imitation of goodness and wisdom constitutes the likeness and pertains to man’s free activity.
- Ps. 91.9. The communication of knowledge is according to the five contemplations met with above, Char 1.78 n. 60. Pegon, 135 n. 1, denies any Dionysian influence in the entire chapter, preferring to emphasize the importance of angelic illumination in Evagrius and Origen. This latter influence, however, does not exclude all possibility of the former.
- Chapters 34–36 depend on the tripartite distinction of man, spoken of in the Introd. 84.
- What difference there is between this sentence and the Terentian dictum (Heaut. 77): ‘Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto’!
- Cf. Char 2,18, n. 93.
- Cf. Evagrius, Practicos 1.71.
- Cf. Evagrius, Cent. 1.87.
- Matt. 5.3 ff. For the doctrine of intention illustrated here and in the next chapter, see the references at Char 2.36, n. 111.
- Ps. 91.12.
- John 5.22; Matt. 7.1 with Luke 6.37.
- 1 Cor. 4.5 and Rom. 2.1.
- Jer. 2.12.
- Ps. 4.3 (modified).
- Cf. Gal. 2.2.
- Cf. Evagrius, Practicos 2.31. For other chapters on vainglory see Char 1.30 n. 21.
- ‘Secret exercise,’ that is, of the virtues. Cf. Char 4.43.
- Chapters 63–72 (note, a group of 10) treat of the relation of knowledge and desire. Mere, bare knowledge is not enough; there must be the ‘blessed passion (πάθος) of holy charity’ (67, cf. 71). Along with this theme is that of the precarious nature of our contemplation and knowledge, due to its being now in figure and enigma—a situation which permits the passage from (mere) knowledge again to earthly passions. The figured and enigmatic nature of our knowledge makes it the special thing it is, an acquired habit of understanding the figures of Scripture and nature (69).
- For chapters 63,64 cf. Evagrius, Practicos 1.21; also Char 1.1. This chapter makes peculiarly clear that desire is not extinguished but must be put on the right track. Cf. Char 2.48 and n. 116, also 71 below.
- Cf. 2 Peter 2.22.
- 2 Cor. 5.7.
- See Char 3.19.
- Viller 241. In such common sentiments to indicate parallels or even a dependence signifies little.
- ‘Free-speech’ (παρρησία) is primitively the freedom of speech which Athenian citizens claimed as their right. Here, as often, it refers to that familiarity with God which is the due of sons in His presence, or to the familiarity of brothers one with the other. See Char 1.50,68; 4.32; Thal 10–289C; Ep 32–628A. Cf. the observations by H. Graef, ACW 18.183 n. 26.
- ‘Departure’ (ἔξοδος) is to be understood of the departure of death, not of pure prayer (ἐκδημία—cf. Char 1.10 n. 1). Death is the sense in Char 4.33 and Ep 12–612A.
- On knowledge of self as means to further knowledge (of God) cf. Thal 63–673D and Introd. 90.
- ‘Prudence’ here equals worldly wisdom.
- Prov. 12.28; 21.24 (Sept.).
- Rom. 12.15.
- Cf. Char 2.32 and n. 109.
- Cf. Char 2.56 and n. 122.
- See Char 1.100 and n. 79.
- This chapter requires a critique of the relations of Evagrian and Maximian doctrine. Viller (249) in commenting this chapter supposes the theory of knowledge of Evagrius and Maximus to be the same. Hausherr expounds this theory in his comment on the 50th chapter of Evagrius’ De oratione (MG 79.1177). The Evagrian text runs thus: ‘Why do the demons wish to rouse in us gluttony, fornication, greed, wrath and the recollection of wrongs, and the rest of the passions? In order that the mind, coarsened by these, may not be able to pray as is fitting; for as the passions of the irrational part of man dominate, they do not allow it to be rationally moved to seek the Word of God.’ Hausherr comments upon this as follows. The coarsening or thickening of the mind recalls the Origenist speculations on the fall of the spirits in diverse degrees of matter (see Introd. 47). The ultimate in man is then his intellect, his mind. ‘A great principle dominates all, though it is nowhere formulated as a general axiom: knowledge is a real assimilation of the knower to the known.’ And in the footnote: ‘One could get a perfect formulation of this principle by inversion of what Evagrius says of God (Letter 8, of Basil, n. 7): ‘God knows what He is’; the created intellect is what it knows’ (Hausherr, ‘Le traité de l’oraison d’Évagre le Pontique,’ Rev. d’asc. et myst. 15 [1934] 82). In view of the terminology of our present chapter (the mind being patterned after, conformed to each object of contemplation) is there any ground for Viller’s supposition? It seems to me that there is none. I have already pointed out (Introd. 39) how Maximus can take over an Evagrian passage, explicitly insisting on certain distinctions which avoid completely the confusion of the moral and ontological orders. The same error underlies the Evagrian theory of knowledge as sketched by Hausherr. But elsewhere Maximus is very definite in his refutation of Origen’s theory of spirit’s progressive embodiment according to the degree of sin (see Introd. 51). He allows that there is a real intellectual knowledge originating in sense knowledge (Introd. 66). Now it is noteworthy that Maximus does not speak of the mind as being ‘coarsened’ or the like. This ‘patterning after,’ this ‘conforming to,’ are illustrated in another chapter (Char 2.52), where obviously the effect of the ‘patterning’ is moral, not ontological. Once again therefore Evagrius and Origen have been corrected and the confusion of the moral and ontological orders avoided.
- See Introd. 89 and nn. 383–85,418,419. Viller (248) confronts with Evagrius, Centuries 3.15 (Frankenberg 199). In the Introduction my critique of Hausherr’s article on this chapter implied that his conclusion—the Dionysian vocabulary is merely superimposed on the Evagrian thought—is not accurate. What then are we to say? The Dionysian and Evagrian ‘techniques’ are diverse and in tension, but God remains the goal of either. That Maximus’ underlying thought is wholly Evagrian has not been proved. As to ‘providence’ and ‘judgment,’ it is not Evagrian; as to theory of knowledge (see preceding n.), it is not Evagrian; as to knowledge of God, that is here the question. But is there really excluded the possibility that the modalities of the two techniques are here deliberately juxtaposed in view of the profounder harmony? For a more extensive study of these relations, see The Earlier Ambigua ch. IV.
- 1 Cor. 13.13. ‘Time’ (χρόνος) is dealt with in ThOec 1.5. The threefold division here in view is doubtless that of the law of nature, in writing, and of grace (Thal 64–724C ff.). The second part of the chapter refers not to time but to eternity.